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INFORMAL AGENCY RULEMAKING AND
THE COURTS: A THEORY FOR
PROCEDURAL REVIEW
COOLEY R. HOWARTH, JR.*
PROLOGUE
In the celebrated Vermont Yankee' case, the Supreme Court at-
tempted to restrict what it saw as intrusive judicial supervision of the
procedural discretion afforded federal administrative agencies engaged
in informal, "notice and comment" rulemaking.2 The Court declared
that the procedural format for such rulemaking is a matter governed
solely by statutory mandate and administrative discretion, not judicial
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., 1971, Michigan
State University; J.D., 1976, University of Denver. I wish to express my appreciation to Frederick
B. Davis, Edward H. Ziegler, and Richard B. Saphire for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article and to Karen Gray-Meyers, J.D., 1983, University of Dayton, for her valuable
research and editorial assistance.
1. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
2. The federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets out two procedural formats for
agency rulemaking: informal, "notice and comment" rulemaking and formal rulemaking. 5
U.S.C. §§ 553, 556, 557 (1982). Unless Congress specifies otherwise, most administrative rule-
makers need follow only the informal notice and comment rulemaking procedures. See United
States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). Under these procedures, an agency engaged
in substantive rulemaking must publish a public notice of proposed rulemaking outlining its pro-
posal, allow for public comment, usually in writing, on the proposal, and provide a concise gen-
eral statement of the basis and purpose for the promulgated final rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c)
(1982). In certain instances Congress may decide that a more formal procedure should be used by
the agency. When the agency's enabling statute specifies that rules are "to be made on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing," agency rulemakers are required to utilize a trial-type
hearing procedure outlined in §§ 556-57 of the APA. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410
U.S. 224, 234-37 (1973). This article is concerned only with the adequacy of the informal, notice
and comment rulemaking format.
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preference. The extent of a court's procedural review of informal
agency rulemaking is to be marked by the procedural dictates of the
agency's organic statute and the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). "Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling cir-
cumstances,"3 these congressional requirements are the maximum pro-
cedures which courts may impose upon rulemakers.4 The employment
of supplemental or different procedures is a matter left to the discretion
of the agency-a discretion which reviewing courts are not to subject to
"Monday morning quarterbacking" or "Kafkaesque" remands for per-
ceived procedural shortcomings.'
Had the Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee been directed at an'iso-
lated incident of overzealous judicial intervention in agency rulemak-
ing, the case probably would have evoked little comment. The breadth
of the opinion, however, left little doubt that the court intended to halt
the active judicial review of informal rulemaking procedures which
had, over the years, become a basic tenet of the "collaborative partner-
ship" between rulemakers and reviewing courts.' After Vermont Yan-
kee, judicial review of agency rulemaking was to be directed away
from procedural concerns towards increased reliance on substantive
analysis of the agency's rule. In the six years since Vermont Yankee,
however, many commentators have expressed serious doubts about the
wisdom of the Court's approach.7 Moreover, an examination of lower
court opinions reveals that many reviewing courts have simply ignored
the spirit, if not the letter, of Vermont Yankee.'
The lack of enthusiasm evident in these academic and judicial reac-
3. 435 U.S. at 543.
4. Id at 524.
5. Id at 547, 557-58.
6. See, eg., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 848-49 (D.C. Cir.
1972). See generally DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA.
L. REV. 257 (1979); Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345.
7. See, e.g., Davis,Administraton Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 3 UTAH
L. REV. 3 (1980); McGowan, Rqflections on Rulemaking Review, 53 TUL. L. REV. 681 (1979); Na-
thanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece oStatutory Misinterpreta-
lion, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 183 (1979); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of
Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); National Lime Ass'n V. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980); East Tex. Motor
Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 593 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590
F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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tions to Vermont Yankee is not hard to understand. Administrative
rulemaking, once referred to as "one of the greatest inventions of mod-
em government,"9 has long been in need of an overhaul. The bare-
boned procedural format of notice and comment rulemaking no longer
provides a mechanism which insures that difficult regulatory problems
will be resolved by decisionmakers armed with either sufficient data or
the adequate means to evaluate that data. While Congress has long
been aware of this problem, so far it has failed to provide an updated
informal rulemaking procedure tailored to meet the demands of most
modem regulatory problems. 10
Prior to Vermont Yankee, a number of agencies were prompted to
reform their informal rulemaking procedures when reviewing courts
began to subject their procedural decisions to more careful scrutiny."
In some instances these courts remanded agency rules when the agency
had failed to employ rulemaking procedures beyond those expressly
outlined in the agency's organic statute or the APA.' 2 This judicial
attention to the procedural aspects of the informal rulemaking process
was directly credited with improving the quality of substantive agency
decisionmaking.13 Vermont Yankee threatens to stifle these reforms.
The Supreme Court's literal approach to the informal rulemaking pro-
visions of the APA and the Court's narrow view of the scope of proce-
dural judicial review affords administrative rulemakers far too much
discretion, allowing agencies to resolve increasingly complex economic
and social issues under procedures which give little assurance of rea-
soned decisionmaking.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the Vermont Yankee deci-
sion is its potential for undermining confidence in the legitimacy of
9. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970).
10. See, for example, the history of the United States Senate's unsuccessful attempts to re-
form the rulemaking process in S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1981).
11. See, e.g., United States Food and Drug Administration, Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedures, 40 Fed. Reg. 22,950-23,046 (1975) (amending scattered sections of 21 C.F.R.); 37 Fed.
Reg. 8664 (1972) (rules on cross-examination in OSHA rulemaking proceedings) (currently codi-
fied as amended at 29 C.F.R. § 1911.15(a)(3) (1983)). See also the discussions of the EPA's devel-
opment of "hybrid" rulemaking procedures in Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 59-60 (1975); Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and Quasi-
ConstitutionalLaw in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessonsfrom the ClearAir
4ct, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 731 n.89 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Har-
vester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13. Pedersen, supra note 11, at 59-60; Stewart, supra note 11, at 731.
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agency rulemaking. It has always been clear that, regardless of the
amount of discretion Congress believed an agency must have in order
to deal with the complexities of the social and economic responsibilities
entrusted to it, Congress also envisioned a process of regulatory
rulemaking that would be both fair and accountable. While the case
law prior to Vermont Yankee generated procedural safeguards which
tended to reinforce the fairness and accountability of the APA's infor-
mal rulemaking process, thereby providing a basis for public assurance
that the agency had acted legitimately, 4 Vermont Yankee's apparent
rejection of that case law removes much. of the basis for that public
confidence. Given the current scope of regulatory authority and the
national significance of the social and economic problems to be re-
solved by agencies, literal compliance with the notice and comment
procedures of the APA no longer provides a politically acceptable
method for the development of regulatory policy. Congressional inac-
tion coupled with Vermont Yankee's proscriptions threatens to impede
the evolution of decisionmaking processes which not only respond
functionally to these regulatory challenges, but which also preserve the
political values which support and legitimize the use of administrative
agencies.
The problem with administrative rulemaking has always been one
which could be simply stated: Federal rulemakers who have been
granted broad discretion to set national regulatory policy must be held
accountable for accomplishing that task in a way that is not only effi-
cient and effective, but is also fair to all concerned. During the past ten
years we have seen the emergence of a number of "reforms" which
have sought to resolve this multifaceted problem by imposing greater
control on the rulemaking arena. Deregulation, legislative vetoes, and
the imposition of cost-benefit analysis on all major rulemaking are ex-
amples of congressional and executive responses to the problem.1 5 The
issue now becomes one of defining the proper role of the judiciary in
supervising agency rulemaking. Should courts, as Vermont Yankee
seems to demand, be limited to reviewing the substantive rationality of
14. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330
(D.C. Cir. 1968); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
843 (1966).
15. For a discussion of these recent congressional and presidential efforts, see Pierce & Sha-
piro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1175, 1195-220 (1981).
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agency decisions? Or should courts be allowed to supplement this sub-
stantive review with careful oversight of the procedural decisions of
agency rulemakers? While many judges and commentators have an-
swered the latter question in the affirmative, these authorities have
failed to articulate any comprehensive rationale which would either
support the legitimacy of judicial review of informal agency rulemak-
ing procedures or even meet the practical concerns which prompted the
Supreme Court's limitations on such review. 6
This Article will demonstrate that judicial review of agency rulemak-
ing procedures, if properly structured, is an acceptable and important
tool for the control of regulatory policy-making. The procedural dis-
cretion of administrative rulemakers should not be as broad as Vermont
Yankee suggests. Courts have the power to review the procedural deci-
sions of rulemakers and to require the use of rulemaking procedures
which meet the minimum requirements established not only by the let-
ter of the APA, but by its spirit as well. There are certain procedural
values inherent in the concept of notice and comment rulemaking. An
interpretation of the APA's informal rulemaking procedures in light of
these values reveals that courts can and should review the procedural
choices of rulemakers and require more than mere literal compliance
with the APA. Moreover, while agencies may enjoy considerable pro-
cedural discretion beyond the statutory minima, that discretion should
be subjected to a judicial review designed to insure that, in any given
context, rulemaking proceedings will respond to the procedural values
inherent in the concept of informal administrative rulemaking.
The first part of this Article will identify the procedural values which
should serve as normative guides to the adequacy and legitimacy of
informal rulemaking. The second part will examine the Supreme
Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee, criticizing its approach to proce-
dural review of informal rulemaking as a threat to the integrity of that
rulemaking process. In the third section of the Article, the judicial and
scholarly reactions to Vermont Yankee will be examined and critiqued.
It is clear that neither the courts nor the commentators have yet suc-
ceeded in developing an approach to procedural review of informal
rulemaking which adequately responds to the problems created by Ver-
mont Yankee. The Article will conclude with a suggested theory for
procedural review of informal rulemaking. This theory will present an
16. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 7; McGowan, supra note 7; Stewart, supra note 7.
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instrumental interpretation of section 553 of the APA which establishes
the minimum procedural requirements needed to preserve the proce-
dural values that insure the integrity of informal rulemaking. The the-
ory will also outline a method and supporting rationale for judicial
review of the discretionary procedural decisions of agency
rulemakers-decisions by agencies to employ (or not employ) addi-
tional rulemaking procedures beyond those minimally required by the
APA.
I. PROCEDURAL VALUES IN INFORMAL RULEMAKING
While the search for procedural values has received a good deal of
attention at the hands of constitutional scholars,17 a number of eminent
authorities on administrative law have attempted to specify those val-
ues which should animate administrative procedure as well. Dean
Roger Cramton has suggested that accuracy, efficiency, and acceptabil-
ity should be considered hallmarks of fair administrative procedure.18
Dean Paul Verkuil has told us that administrative procedure should
provide fair and efficient decisionmaking processes which satisfy the
participants in those processes.19 Gilbert Hahn would test the ade-
quacy of administrative procedures by examining the extent to which
those procedures are suitable, adaptable to the tasks at hand, and pro-
ductive of results to which the public can consent.20 James Freedman
has rested the very legitimacy of the administrative process on its fair-
ness, effectiveness, and accountability. 21
These commentators have been concerned, however, with the admin-
istrative process as a whole, examining both adjudicative as well as leg-
islative agency decisionmaking. Thus the principles they have
identified reflect constitutional as well as statutory values. In rulemak-
ing, of course, reliance on constitutional principles of procedural ade-
17. See, e.g., Michelman, Formal andAssociationalAims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE
PRocEss: NoMos XVIII 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Mashaw, The Supreme Court~'
Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values:
Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978).
18. See Cramton,A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv.
585, 591-93 (1972).
19. See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258,
279-93 (1978).
20. See Hahn, ProceduralAdequacy in Administrative Decisionmaking: 4 Unified Formulation
(pts. 1 & 2), 30 AD. L. REv. 467 (1978), 31 AD. L. REV. 31 (1979).
21. See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 11 (1978).
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quacy is misplaced.22 The search for normative guides to the adequacy
of rulemaking procedures must instead focus upon congressional intent
and judicial interpretation of that intent. Such an inquiry leads to the
conclusion that the APA's rulemaking provisions were intended to pro-
vide a decisionmaking process that would be efficient, effective, fair,
and accountable.
A. Efficiency
It seems almost unnecessary to stress the importance of preserving
procedural efficiency in the development of regulatory policy. Faced
with an enormous regulatory agenda and finite resources, government
must attempt to conserve time, money, and effort wherever possible if it
is to have any hope of accomplishing its tasks. Prescriptive rulemaking
by administrative agencies was initially conceived as a method of for-
mulating policy which would avoid the delay, expense, and uncertainty
attendant to judicial or legislative implementation of regulatory goals;
procedural efficiency remains an important factor in the design of
rulemaking procedures. Agency efforts to attain simplicity and flex-
ibility in the design of rulemaking procedures are consistently en-
dorsed. Where an agency is truly engaged in setting regulatory
standards with general impact and future effect, courts routinely turn
back attempts to impose redundant, unnecessary, or overly formal pro-
cedures. In the name of procedural efficiency, courts reject argu-
ments which would force agencies, as a matter of due process, to
establish policy on a case-by-case basis.24 Practical concerns demand
that agency rulemaking be freed of the procedural constraints of due
process.2 Even where Congress arguably requires that policy be devel-
oped by means of more cumbersome procedures, courts often allow,
and even encourage, agencies to avoid these procedures and employ
simpler, more efficient methods.2 6
It seems unlikely that this concern for procedural economy in
rulemaking will diminish in the future. As the scope and complexity of
22. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915). See
also United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244-45 (1973).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
24. See FPC v. Texaco, 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192 (1956); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
25. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
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the economic and social problems facing administrative agencies con-
tinues to increase, so does the importance of efficient rulemaking. As a
result, rulemaking procedures should be designed to take into account
the costs, to both government and the regulated community, of using
those procedures.
B. Effectiveness
The procedures for rulemaking should also be designed with an eye
toward their effectiveness. Rulemaking procedures should be struc-
tured to promote rational implementation of the legislative power dele-
gated to the agency.27 Indeed, as the legislative history of the APA
indicates, one of the primary purposes of establishing notice and com-
ment rulemaking was to provide a procedure which would serve both
to inform and to educate agency rulemakers.2 8 While no particular
rulemaking procedure can ever guarantee that an agency will reach a
rational result,29 the procedural format of the rulemaking process can
certainly enhance the ability of the agency to reach such a result.
To the extent that regulatory policy is no longer solely a product of
in-house agency expertise, an effective rulemaking process will be one
that is continually open to information or opinions that may assist in
the development of new policy. Participation in the rulemaking pro-
cess by those who may be directly affected by the agency's proposed
rule will provide the agency with valuable information about the prob-
27. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) ("[T]he validity of a
regulation ... will be sustained so long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation.") (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)). See American
Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 308-13 (1953).
28. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1946); SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 201
(1945); STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 20 (Comm. Print 1945); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERN-
MENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 102, 103, 108 (1941) [hereinafter cited as
FINAL REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT 31 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ATT'Y GEN. MAN.]. The Senate Judiciary
Committee Print and both the Senate and House Reports cited above were reprinted in LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1946, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST.].
29. See Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 394 (1974). But see Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027-28
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
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able implications of its tentative policy choice and may serve to identify
policy alternatives.3" When the rulemaking process proceeds to the
evaluation of accumulated data, its effectiveness will be dependent
upon the extent to which the procedures used serve both to discipline
and to improve the agency's evaluative skills. Thus, an agency which is
required to respond to the material data it has received from the public
and to provide some public demonstration of its deliberative process
will have a strong incentive to examine its data carefully, to identify
and discard irrelevant, redundant, or erroneous information, and to de-
velop a logical and coherent rationale for its ultimate decision. The
effectiveness of this evaluative stage also will be affected by the extent
to which it is structured to allow for outside participation in the ap-
praisal of data. Since agencies possess no monopoly on evaluative ex-
pertise, a rulemaking procedure which allows for the critical
examination of data by those who may be affected by the proposed rule
cannot fail to result in a more informed decision.
C. Fairness
The notion that rulemaking procedures should be fair has found
wide acceptance in the case law and scholarly commentary.3 1 But some
unresolved questions concerning the source and content of this particu-
lar aspect of rulemaking procedure still remain. When an agency pur-
ports to use a legislative format to accomplish an adjudicative purpose,
its procedure will be tested for a fairness of constitutional origin and
dimension.32 When the agency is truly engaged in legislative activity,
30. See LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 20; FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 101-03. See
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The importance of securing a broad base of relevant data in
rulemaking has prompted agencies and reviewing courts to concern themselves with the adequacy
of rulemaking notices and the need for additional public input when new issues arise or the
agency's initial proposals are significantly altered. See, for example, the cases discussed in
Rochvarg, Adequacy of Notice of Rulemaking under the Federal Administrative Procedure .4Ac-
When Should a Second Round of Notice and Comment be Provided?, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1981)
and Note, Toward a More Complete Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: .4 Judicial Overview and
Suggestionsfor Change, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 227 (1981).
31. See. e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977); O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin,
449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 630 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). See also J. FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 11; Verkuil, supra note 19, at 279-80; Wright,
supra note 29, at 379-81.
32. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
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however, the due process clause has little, if any, role to play in shaping
the fairness required of rulemakers. 33 Instead, procedural fairness in
rulemaking seems governed by repeated, though extremely vague, ad-
monitions found in the legislative history and judicial interpretations of
the APA.34 While these brief references may serve as legitimate
sources for a requirement of procedural fairness in rulemaking, they
offer little guidance as to its scope or implications.
Judge Skelly Wright, the only commentator to attempt a definitive
analysis of this issue, has suggested that, in the context of notice and
comment rulemaking, procedural fairness does not require that the af-
fected public be afforded a right to participate in the rulemaking pro-
cess or that the procedures chosen promote either accuracy or
accountability in agency decisionmaking.35 Rather, for Judge Wright,
fairness simply requires that a rulemaker not hide his decision or his
reasoning, or fail "to give good faith attention to all the information
and contending views relevant to the issues before him." 6 In other
words, in rulemaking, fairness requires only that the process of deci-
sion-making be "openly informed, reasoned, and candid. 37 Moreover,
Judge Wright feels that with a bit of creative statutory construction on
the part of the courts, the APA's notice and comment rulemaking pro-
cedures are more than sufficient to enforce this conception of proce-
dural fairness in rulemaking.s8
There is much to commend in Judge Wright's perceptive analysis.
Certainly fairness requires that a rulemaker consider and evaluate the
data she has gathered or received with openness and honesty. The in-
tegrity of the rulemaking process depends in no small part on the pub-
lie's confidence that the agency's closed-door deliberations are
conscientious, even-handed, and rational. A rulemaker who com-
pletely ignores public comments filed with the agency, closes her mind
to the input of certain participants, or gives greater weight to submitted
U.S. 519 (1978); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 369 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
33. See cases cited supra note 22.
34. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969); Association of Nat'l Adver-
tisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); LEG. HIST.,
supra note 28, at 187, 200, 258; FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 104; AT'Y GEN. MAN., supra
note 28, at 124; see also cases cited supra note 31.
35. Wright, supra note 29, at 379.
36. Id.
37. Id
38. Id at 380-81, 395.
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data on the basis of its source rather than its substantive content, is not
acting fairly or in the public's interest. The same is true of a rulemaker
who grants some of the parties to a proceeding access to or influence
upon the deliberative stages of the rulemaking process which is denied
to or kept secret from other parties to the proceeding. In addition, fair-
ness is compromised when the agency's public explanation of its delib-
erative process fails to represent accurately the agency's thinking.
Unfortunately, Judge Wright's analysis of procedural fairness in
rulemaking does not go far enough. If the rulemaking process is to be a
fair process, that fairness must permeate the entire process, not just the
agency's private deliberations. The rulemaking process also includes a
stage of public notice and participation which precedes these delibera-
tions. These initial phases of the rulemaking process must also be
designed and executed in a way that is fair to those affected by the
proposed rule.
Judge Wright is correct when he observes that the right to participate
in rulemaking does not emanate from some notion of procedural fair-
ness. Rather, the right to participate in rulemaking finds its origins in
the APA, where Congress codified its perception that public participa-
tion is "essential . . . to afford adequate safeguards to private inter-
ests."139 It is only after recognition of this statutory right to participate
that notions of procedural fairness in rulemaking take on significance.
The public's right to participate, once granted, must then be structured
and protected in order to achieve a procedural fairness which assures
the public a genuine opportunity to know what the agency proposes to
do and to inform the agency's final decision.
This approach to the issue of fairness in rulemaking should charac-
terize not only administrative and judicial interpretation of the APA's
required rulemaking procedures, but also the implementation of any
procedural discretion which Congress affords informal rulemakers.
Under this approach, the concern for fairness should have procedural
ramifications at all stages of informal rulemaking. Thus, whenever an
agency engages in rulemaking it must provide public notice which will
"fairly apprise interested parties of the issues involved."4 To that end,
public notice in informal rulemaking should be sufficiently detailed to
"adequately frame the subjects for discussion" and provide a complete
39. LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 20 (citing FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 101-03).
40. Id at 200.
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and "accurate picture of the reasoning that has led the agency to the
proposed rule."' 4 1 Moreover, there is no reason to conclude that Con-
gress intended to limit the public's statutory right to notice to the pre-
comment stage of informal rulemaking. Rather, the right should ex-
tend throughout the rulemaking process, imposing an obligation on the
agency to provide the public with continuous notice of and access to all
information pertinent to the rulemaking proceeding. Absent such de-
tailed and continuous notice of what the agency is proposing to do, the
public's right to inform the rulemaking process is unacceptably jeop-
ardized and the fairness of the entire proceeding is compromised.
In the public comment stage of rulemaking, fairness requires that an
agency structure its procedures in a way which responds to the needs
and capabilities of those affected by the rulemaking proceeding. When
agency rulemakers attempt to resolve different types of regulatory
problems which affect the public in different degrees or different ways,
the agency's procedures should be designed to accommodate diverse
modes of public participation. For example, the significance or public
importance of a particular rulemaking proceeding may, as a matter of
fairness, require a procedure which meets the needs of a broadly based,
less organized, or less sophisticated public participation.42 When the
agency's rule will have a markedly different impact on various seg-
ments of the public, the proceeding will inevitably take on an adver-
sarial element. In such situations, fairness requires that the agency
disclose all public comments on its proposed rule and provide an op-
portunity for response or rebuttal in order to insure that the agency's
evaluation of the competing viewpoints and interests is fully informed.
Fairness also requires that the design of rulemaking procedures be
sensitive to the nature of the issues involved in any particular proceed-
ing. This requirement merely reflects the fact that certain procedures
are better suited to the resolution of certain types of issues.43 For ex-
ample, use of trial-type procedures in rulemaking has been rejected on
grounds that it is an ineffective and inefficient method for resolving
broad policy-type questions.44 This same conclusion might also be
41. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530, 533 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 79 (1982).
42. See LEG. HIsT., supra note 28, at 200-01, 259.
43. See Verkuil, supra note 19, at 303-10; Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under theAdminis-
tralive Procedure Act:A. Legal and Empirical Anayss, 42 U. CHi. L. REv. 401, 403-11 (1975).
44. See, e.g., Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 72-5, Proce-
dures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, I C.F.R. § 305.72-5(3) (1983); Boyer,
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reached on grounds of procedural fairness. The proponent of a rule,
asked to prove the efficacy of a particularly political proposal by means
of an evidentiary trial, could probably be excused if she felt unfairly
handicapped by the required procedure. On the other hand, when the
agency's ultimate policy choice will rest largely upon empirical ques-
tions about which there is some dispute, fairness requires that such
questions be resolved in a trial-like setting in order to ensure an accu-
rate result. While the concern for accuracy has been thought largely
misplaced when the issue facing a rulemaker is essentially a choice be-
tween competing value judgments, 45 it is possible to achieve at least
some degree of accuracy in decisionmaking when the issues are factual
in nature.' Given the significant impact which agency rulemaking can
have upon the regulated community and other interested persons, accu-
racy will indeed become relevant to the fairness of rulemaking pro-
ceedings involving factual issues and may counsel the use of
procedures conducive to accurate fact-finding.
If the congressional call for fairness in rulemaking is to be fully
heeded, an agency's rulemaking procedures must offer more than an
impression or symbolic reassurance of fair decision-making. Procedural
fairness can and should have concrete implications throughout the en-
tire rulemaking process. To that end, the requirement of fairness must
be read to impose an enforceable duty upon agencies to interpret and
employ the APA's rulemaking procedures in a way that is not only
rational, but open, even-handed, candid, and responsive to context.
D. Accountability
The final value which should affect the procedural structure of a
rulemaking proceeding is a concern for the accountability of the ad-
ministrative agency. Agency accountability, a basic and pervasive
principle of administrative law, has always provided a major source of
the political legitimacy of regulatory authority.47 Granted sometimes
vast lawmaking and enforcement powers, the unelected "fourth branch
Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearingsfor Revolving Complex Scienfigc, Economic, and
SociaIssues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972); Hamilton, Procedures/or the Adoption ofRules of
General .4pplicability: The Needfor Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 1276 (1972).
45. See Williams, supra note 43, at 407-08.
46. See id at 404-07.
47. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 58-77.
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of government" has always been subject to the supervision of one or
more of the other branches. While in recent years both Congress and
the President have developed new mechanisms to strengthen their own
oversight powers,4" the major responsibility for supervising the conduct
of administrative agencies has fallen to the judiciary. The courts have
been charged with seeing that the actions of agencies remain consistent
with the Constitution and the instructions of their democratically
elected principals.4 9
With the enormous expansion of administrative authority during the
last twenty years, particularly in the area of rulemaking, the growing
concern for agency accountability has altered both the nature and sig-
nificance of judicial review of agency action. The relationship between
agencies and courts now is seen as a collaborative partnership for the
effectuation of regulatory policy.50 Agency rulemaking is subject to a
much more frequent and intensive judicial scrutiny. While a court
might have been willing in the past to presume the rationality of agency
decisionmaking,5 I now that entire decisionmaking process is subject to
a "thorough, probing, in-depth review."5 While a "presumption of
regularity" still attaches to all agency rules, limiting the court's role to
insuring that the agency's rule is rational, informal rulemaking is none-
theless subject to a "searching and careful inquiry. 53 What is sought is
some assurance that the agency is engaged in fair and principled
decisionmaking.54
Given this heightened concern for administrative accountability, it is
somewhat curious that some commentators nevertheless feel that ac-
48. See, e.g., Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 1195-220 (discusses legislative veto provi-
sions in regulatory enactments and executive attempts to control agency discretion).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (requiring courts to insure that agencies do not stray beyond the'
bounds of their statutory and constitutional authority and that agency decisiomnaking represents
a rational implementation of delegated authority free from procedural error).
50. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Greater Boston Televi-
sion Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See
also Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 135, 138 (1982).
51. Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935).
52. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
53. Id at 416. See also Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law
Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699, 704-08 (1979).
54. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1145.48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1042 (1980); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Friends of the
Earth v. AEC, 485 F.2d 1031, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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countability has no role to play in the design of agency rulemaking
procedures. Most participants in the administrative process would
disagree, believing rather that agency rulemaking procedures can and
should be structured to enhance the ability of the courts and Congress
to supervise the fairness and substantive rationality of agency action.
The APA requires rulemakers to prepare a public explanation of the
basis and purpose for their rules to assist in the process of public, con-
gressional and judicial oversight.56 The Supreme Court has often in-
sisted that agencies supply reviewing courts with contemporaneous
documentation and a full explanation of their decisionmaking
processes.57 In the last fifteen years, lower federal courts have often
imposed procedural requirements on agency rulemakers which the
courts felt were necessary to insure competent judicial review.58 In-
deed, some judges have observed that agency accountability is better
served by procedural review of agency action than by the uninformed
substantive scrutiny of the courts.59 Finally, both Congress and the
President have sought to enhance the accountability of administrative
agencies by requiring new analytic procedures in all rulemaking
proceedings.'
Agency accountability is a value basic to the integrity of administra-
tive law which, if not out of necessity then surely as a matter of policy,
should inform and influence the procedural design of agency rulemak-
ing. Those who have been charged with insuring the accountability of
agency rulemakers have consistently warned that effective supervision
demands a persistent sensitivity on the part of the agency to the needs
of the supervisors.6" That sensitivity can, and probably should, be
55. See Wright, supra note 29, at 379.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
57. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 549 (1978); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1975); Camp v. Pitts., 411 U.S.
138, 143 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971).
58. See, e.g.. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied 103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253
(2d Cir. 1977); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
59. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (Bazelon, J., concurring), cert.
denied 426 U.S. 941 (1976); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651, 652
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). See also Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through
the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 817, 823 (1977); McGowan, Reflections on Rulemaking
Review. 53 TUL. L. REV. 681, 687 (1979).
60. See, e.g., S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S2713-21 (daily ed. Mar. 24,
1982) (passed by the Senate); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
61. See supra notes 57, 58 & 60.
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
906 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
manifested in the employment of rulemaking procedures which pro-
mote the effectiveness of judicial and congressional review. To that
end, the procedures chosen by rulemakers should be geared to provide
a complete, accurate, and understandable explanation of the agency's
rulemaking process-an explanation which demonstrates that the pro-
cess has been both fair and rational.
II. VERMONT YANKEE AND INFORMAL RULEMAKING
Vermont Yankee may not have had the immediate and devastating
impact on judicial review of agency rulemaking procedures which its
author intended or its critics feared,62 but the case nonetheless has had
a definite influence on the manner in which Congress and the courts
have viewed the APA's notice and comment rulemaking procedures
and the relationship between reviewing courts and administrative
rulemakers6 3 Now, with the apparent demise of the latest congres-
sional efforts to revise the rulemaking provisions of the APA,64 at-
tempts to refresh the informal rulemaking process for the regulatory
problems of the coming decade will have to confront directly the signif-
icant obstacles to reform presented by Vermont Yankee. The Court's
opinion in that case seems not only to embrace an unrealistic approach
to judicial review of the procedural discretion of rulemakers, but also
to present a serious threat to the effectuation of the procedural values
which must characterize legitimate administrative rulemaking.
The Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee was specifically concerned
with judicial imposition of rulemaking procedures beyond those called
for by the APA. The opinion suggests that judicial construction of the
APA's rulemaking provisions rarely should stray from a literal reading
of the statutory text. Throughout the opinion the Court seems to treat
the APA as a "Magna Charta" for administrative procedure, to be ap-
proached with a judicial reverence reminiscent of strict constitutional
construction. 5 Quoting verbatim from the text of the APA the Court
declared that section 553 established the "maximum procedural re-
62. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at 15-16; Stewart, supra note 7, at 1820-22.
63. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9, 14-36 (1981); S. REP. No. 284, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 93-106 (1981). See also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 391-92 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1169-71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980).
64. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CoNG. REc. S2713-18 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982). See
also Legal Times, Jan. 17, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
65. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 375-82.
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quirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose"
upon agency rulemakers.66 Indeed, it is hard to come away from the
opinion without concluding that, regardless of the context, a court's re-
view of procedural matters in rulemaking should end when the agency
can demonstrate textual compliance with the undemanding provisions
of section 553. The Court's opinion made it emphatically clear that the
decision to employ rulemaking procedures beyond those specifically re-
quired by the APA is a matter left to the discretion of the agency.67
Although the Court conceded that this procedural discretion is indeed
subject to judicial review, it left no doubt that any such review was to
be extremely narrow, finding procedural abuse only where "constitu-
tional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances" might ex-
ist.6" The Court provided no clue as to what it might consider to be an
"extremely compelling circumstance," but it is unlikely that judicial
perceptions of the relative fairness or efficacy of any particular
rulemaking procedure would be found to justify a procedural remand
to the agency. Apparently the Court feels that the need for efficiency,
uniformity, and predictability in rulemaking requires the recognition of
a broad procedural discretion in agencies, free from the fear of ad hoc
judicial disapproval.69
To the extent that this is an accurate assessment of the Supreme
Court's position on the APA and the procedural discretion enjoyed by
rulemakers, or that Vermont Yankee can be read to suggest even such
an approach to these issues, the case has serious ramifications for ad-
ministrative law. As Judge (then Professor) Scalia has observed, the
Court's scriptural approach to the APA fails to take into account the
apparent flaws in the Act as originally promulgated, the radical
changes in administrative law which have occurred since the passage of
the APA, and the fact that Congress does not now, if it ever did, intend
the APA to be so interpreted.7° Moreover, the recognition of an almost
unfettered procedural discretion in rulemakers threatens to exacerbate
a problem which has plagued administrative law for decades. Broad
administrative discretion, the subject of repeated criticism,71 is un-
66. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978).
67. Id
68. Id at 543.
69. See id at 546-47.
70. Scalia, supra note 6, at 375-88.
71. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-44 (1981) (Rehn-
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wisely and unnecessarily freed of yet another restraint. At a time when
distrust of government has become widespread and belief in the com-
petence of administrative agencies has ebbed,72 Vermont Yankee un-
dercuts a fairly conservative approach to the control of administrative
discretion in rulemaking,73 and can only be considered seriously out-
of-step. Absent the revival of the non-delegation doctrine,74 and given
the limited utility of congressional or executive attempts at oversight,
procedural control of agency rulemakers deserves more careful consid-
eration. As it is, after Vermont Yankee, substantive judicial review ap-
pears to be the only remaining restraint on the discretion of
administrative rulemakers, and there is some doubt whether that
method of control is adequate.7 5
What is most troubling about Vermont Yankee is the effect it may
have on the effectuation of the procedural values which underlie the
administrative rulemaking process. While ostensibly concerned with
the integrity of that process, the case extols the virtues of procedural
efficiency while ignoring a wealth of contemporaneous authority that
the procedural discretion it champions simply fails to insure fair, effec-
tive, or accountable agency rulemaking.76 In fact, the Court's restric-
tions on judicial review of agency rulemaking procedures serve to
quist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst.f 448 U.S. 607, 672 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 207-08; Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 15,
at 1179-80; Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
72. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 31-58.
73. McGowan, supra note 7, at 689; Wald, supra note 50, at 140.
74. Under the non-delegation doctrine, congressional attempts to delegate legislative author-
ity to administrative agencies absent a clear and ascertainable standard to guide and confine the
exercise of that legislative discretion have been held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). For
thorough discussions of the use of the non-delegation doctrine to control the delegation and use of
administrative discretion, see Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
672 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); W. GELLHORN, C. BysE, & P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 52-103 (7th ed. 1979); Wright, supra note 71, at 582-86.
75. Compare authorities cited supra note 59 with Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C.
Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) and Wright, supra note 29 at
388-95.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 33-37 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Leventhal, Environ-
mentalDecisionmaking and the Role of the Court, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 536-40 (1974); Verkuil,
JudicialReview of InformalRulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 234-44 (1974); Williams, supra note
43, at 436-55.
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jeopardize the integrity of informal rulemaking, undermining its fair-
ness, effectiveness, and accountability.
To the extent that Vermont Yankee frees rulemakers of the duty to
utilize procedures more elaborate than the literal requirements of the
APA, informal rulemaking becomes an ineffective process in the mod-
em regulatory context. The vaunted expertise of the administrative
agency, which was an article of faith at midcentury, is simply no longer
a sufficient guarantee of effective policymaking. Rather, effectiveness
in rulemaking will be enhanced only to the extent that the process is
accompanied by comprehensive and continuous public notice of the
agency's intentions, structured to allow for meaningful outside partici-
pation in the accumulation and evaluation of rulemaking data, and
subjected to procedural requirements which provide real incentives for
reasoned regulatory decisionmaking.
Vermont Yankee's proscriptions against judicial review of agency
rulemaking procedures increase the risk that informal rulemaking will
experience a very real reduction in substantive quality. As others have
already noted, there is substantial evidence that the additional proce-
dures once prompted by judicial remands improved the caliber of
agency rulemaking decisions.77 Without the deterrent of procedural re-
view, rulemakers will now have little incentive to experiment with pro-
cedural formats which may prove more effective or appropriate than
the bare-boned notice and comment rulemaking of the APA. Absent
congressional or self-imposed procedural reform, the decisionmaking
discipline which judicial supervision once encouraged could well be
lost as agencies, now shielded by Vermont Yankee, ease into literal
compliance with the APA's undemanding informal rulemaking
procedures.
Vermont Yankee also undermines the fairness of notice and com-
ment rulemaking. Literal compliance with the informal rulemaking
provisions of the APA no longer insures procedural fairness in most
modem rulemaking contexts. Indeed, there are those who contend that
the nature and scope of agency rulemaking has been so significantly
altered since 1946 that no one rulemaking procedure could possibly
insure fairness in every regulatory context.78 Certainly the multitude of
variables which might affect procedural fairness in rulemaking is obvi-
77. See supra note 13.
78. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 400-09. See also GiffordAdministrative Rulemaking and Judi-
cial Review: Some Conceptual Models, 65 MINN. L. REv. 63, 86-88 (1980).
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ous to even the most casual observer of the current regulatory scene.
The nature, complexity, and significance of the problems and issues to
be resolved by rulemakers vary from day to day and from agency to
agency. The experience and expertise which can be brought to bear
upon these problems fluctuate from agency to agency and from prob-
lem to problem. Agency attitudes toward regulation differ. At one ex-
treme, a rulemaker may, in her zeal to accomplish her mission, be blind
to the practical concerns of the regulated community. At the other ex-
treme, she may be captured by that community and be blind to the
public's interest. Finally, the public, whose interest must be served by
the agency, may not retain the same character, degree of interest, or
participatory capability from one rulemaking proceeding to the next.
Given these variables, procedural challenges to the fairness of
agency rulemaking are inevitable. It is extremely unlikely that a fair
notice in one rulemaking context will be "fair" in the next, that one
procedure will always suffice to guarantee the public, however consti-
tuted, a genuine opportunity to inform the agency's decision, or that
the deliberative stages of every rulemaking will be both disciplined and
free from improper influence. It is doubtful that the integrity of the
rulemaking process can long survive an approach to procedural fair-
ness which relies on a literal interpretation of the APA or a procedural
discretion shielded from challenge in all but the rarest circumstances.
Unfortunately that is precisely the approach the Supreme Court has
taken in Vermont Yankee.
The inherent advantage of informal rulemaking lies not only in the
procedural efficiency so adamantly defended in Vermont Yankee, but
also in the acceptability of rulemaking as a legitimate mechanism for
the formulation of regulatory policy. That legitimacy or acceptability
will in turn depend, at least in part, upon the real or apparent fairness
of the informal rulemaking process. To the extent that Vermont Yan-
kee restricts judicial review of the accuracy and scope of rulemaking
notices, of the adequacy of the opportunities provided for public partic-
ipation in the accumulation and evaluation of rulemaking data, or of
the integrity of the agency's deliberations, procedural fairness in
rulemaking will be undermined.
Prior to Vermont Yankee, lower courts often sought to enhance the
accountability of informal agency rulemaking by requiring detailed ex-
planations of the basis and purpose of promulgated rules as an aid to
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substantive judicial review.79 The APA's call for a "concise general
statement" was interpreted functionally. Agencies were required to
identify the issues they had addressed, to detail the evidentiary support
for their findings of fact, and to discuss both the manner in which pol-
icy considerations affected the agency's final rule and the agency's rea-
sons for rejecting contrary findings or opposing arguments.80 While the
APA did not compel the compilation of a record to serve as the basis
for the agency's decision, some courts threatened remands where the
agency did not provide an organized "rulemaking record" to assist the
process of judicial review.8' On rare occasions, courts even suggested
the limited use of trial-type procedures on remand to "flesh-out" dis-
puted factual issues which remained vague or undeveloped after less-
formal rulemaking procedures.82
After Vermont Yankee, the ability of reviewing courts to impose such
procedural requirements, either as an incentive to reasoned decision-
making or as an aid to effective judicial review of the rationality of
agency rules, has become a doubtful proposition at best. Instead, Ver-
mont Yankee redirects judicial review of rulemaking from procedural
review to substantive review and severely restricts the ability of courts
to require enhanced rulemaking procedures which might assist the sub-
stantive review process. By doing so the Court may well have under-
mined the accountability of informal rulemaking.
It has become increasingly clear that substantive judicial review is
often an inadequate means for insuring reasoned agency rulemaking.
This is apparent from the disagreement among courts and commenta-
tors as to even the appropriate scope of substantive review of agency
rules. Some authorities have called for continuation of the "hard look"
review of the last decade which requires a court "to penetrate to the
underlying decisions of the agency, to satisfy itself that the agency has
exercised a reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not deviate from
or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent." 83 Others have counseled
79. Eg., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977);
Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
80. See supra note 79.
81. Eg., Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905
(1976).
82. See. e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631-32, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co.
v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973).
83. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
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a return to a judicial scrutiny that affords maximum deference to the
agency's expertise and judgment.14 Still others have apparently sought
to find some intermediate standard of review which would overturn
agency rules on substantive grounds only in the face of some "manifest
irrationality." 5 This uncertainty concerning the proper scope of sub-
stantive judicial review may result in the same "ad hoc" judicial re-
mands which Vermont Yankee feared, only now the remands will be of
a substantive rather than procedural character.
Equally troubling is the increasing frequency of cases where even
"hard look" substantive review apparently reaches its limits and fails to
insure adequately the accountability of agency rulemakers. For exam-
ple, where rulemaking involves so-called "science policy" issues, even a
dedicated substantive judicial review often seems reduced to a finding
that the agency at least has made a leap of faith in the right direction.
86
As Professor Rodgers has so aptly observed, in many recent cases
"hard look" substantive review might be better described as a "soft
glance."87
In all, a preference for a substantive judicial review unaided by or as
a substitute for its procedural counterpart simply fails to insure the ac-
countability of rulemakers. No matter what one's perspective on the
appropriate relationship between courts and agencies, if Vermont Yan-
kee is read to require exclusive reliance on substantive judicial review
to insure agency accountability, that reliance seems ill-advised. For
those who see the need for active judicial review, the Supreme Court's
prohibitions against procedural review will serve only to decrease the
effectiveness of a substantive review already inadequate to its task. For
others, a judicial review limited exclusively to substantive concerns
presents an increased risk that courts will substitute their own judg-
403 U.S. 923 (1971), cited in National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 & n.126 (D.C. Cir.
1980). See also Rodgers, supra note 53, at 706-08; Stewart, supra note 7, at 1811 & n.26; Wald,
supra note 50, at 151.
84. See Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 354 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Friendly, J.) (citing Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935)).
85. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee 1I, 55
TUL. L. REv. 418, 423 (1981); see also Wright, supra note 29, at 391-94.
86. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 26-29, 31-32 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976), discussed in McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolu-
tion of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729,
780-808 (1979); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
87. Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmak.
ing, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 216-18 (1980).
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ments concerning the wisdom or efficacy of rules for those of the
agency. In either case, accountability in rulemaking suffers.
III. REACTION TO VERMONT YANKEE
A. From the Commentators
Vermont Yankee has drawn a varied response from the academic
community. Some observers have applauded Vermont Yankee as an
attempt to protect the integrity of agency decisionmaking processes
from improper or overzealous judicial tinkering.88 For these scholars,
the case marks a return to what they perceive as the original intent of
the APA-that the administrative agency be able to exercise its own
informed discretion in the design of the procedural framework of
rulemaking.8 9 Unrestrained judicial review of rulemaking procedures,
especially judicial imposition of procedures beyond those required by
the APA, is seen as an unacceptable threat to the procedural discretion
of administrative rulemakers. The fear is that ad hoc procedural re-
mands by reviewing courts will lead agencies to provide elaborate trial-
like rulemaking hearings which will judicialize rulemaking and impair
the efficiency of policy development.90
Other commentators have seen Vermont Yankee in an entirely differ-
ent light. For this group, the case elevates procedural efficiency and
statutory formalism at the expense of fairness, effectiveness, or account-
ability in administrative rulemaking. With varying degrees of viru-
lence, these scholars have excoriated Vermont Yankee as either
destructive, foolish, or out of touch with the realities of administrative
law.9 Invective aside, the thrust of the criticism is that, if the decision
is read literally, Vermont Yankee might well put an end to the most
effective, and perhaps least intrusive, check on agency discretion, a
check utilized by the Supreme Court itself on numerous occasions.92
The Court's statutory literalism freezes administrative law in the rigid
mold of the 1940's-a mold with premises and limitations which no
88. Eg., Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat
Different View, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1823 (1978); Verkuil, supra note 85.
89. See Byse, supra note 88, at 1829.
90. See Wright, supra note 29, at 387-88.
91. See Davis, supra note 7, at 13-17; Rodgers, supra note 53, at 708; Stewart, supra note 7, at
1820.
92. See supra note 91.
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longer accord with modem day regulatory realities.93 These commen-
tators note that the Supreme Court itself recognized the need for
change some time ago and, in past cases, has radically altered the
premises of administrative law.94 Now, in Vermont Yankee, the Court
apparently has failed to see the need for the reform of rulemaking
which should follow from these basic alterations.95
Regardless of their reaction to Vermont Yankee, virtually all com-
mentators recognize that the informal rulemaking procedures of the
APA are simply no longer adequate to the task in many, if not most, of
the regulatory contexts in which they are used.96 All agree that, for one
reason or another, agencies engaged in rulemaking should utilize pro-
cedures which go beyond those specifically outlined in section 553 of
the APA. They differ, of course, as to which additional or enhanced
rulemaking procedures should be encouraged, when those procedures
should be utilized, how to justify supplemental procedures, and, most
emphatically, who should decide whether additional rulemaking proce-
dures are required in any given context-Congress, the courts, or the
agency. By and large, the specific proposals for insuring the adequacy
of agency rulemaking procedures in the wake of Vermont Yankee seem
to fall into three groups: one group which calls for legislative reform of
agency rulemaking procedures, a second group which counsels contin-
ued reliance on the procedural discretion of agency rulemakers, and a
third group which would grant reviewing courts the authority to im-
pose additional or enhanced procedures upon agencies engaged in in-
formal rulemaking.
Among the proponents of a legislative response to Vermont Yankee,
few find solace in the current congressional practice of legislating pro-
cedures on an agency by agency basis.97 While such attempts to hand-
tailor rulemaking procedures for particular agencies or programs may
increase the responsiveness of procedures to different rulemaking con-
texts and allow for valuable experimentation with new or different pro-
cedural formats, the practice has been widely criticized for the
93. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 375; Stewart, supra note 7, at 1805.
94. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 375-78; Stewart, supra note 7, at 1814 & n.41.
95. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 378; Stewart, supra note 7, at 1805.
96. See, e.g., Byse, supra note 88, at 1824; Scalia, supra note 6, at 378-86; Stewart, supra note
7, at 1805; Verkuil, supra note 19, at 323, 327.
97. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1982); Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a)(2) (1982); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605 (1982).
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procedural chaos and confusion it has engendered.98 Many commenta-
tors therefore have suggested that a more uniform and consistent ap-
proach to procedural reform can be achieved through amendments to
the APA. Unfortunately there is little agreement on the nature of these
amendments.
Dean Paul Verkuil suggests a major revision of the APA, a "compre-
hensive solution" which would address not only the procedural
problems of rulemaking, but those endemic to formal and informal ad-
judication as well.99 Rejecting a rigid adherence to the troublesome
distinctions between rulemaking and adjudication, he suggests legisla-
tive amendments which would establish a "unitary administrative pro-
cedure" of public notice, written commentary, and an agency statement
of the reasons for its decision." These basic procedures would be sup-
plemented with oral presentation or cross-examination only in limited
instances.1"' The "unitary" procedure would be utilized in all adminis-
trative decisionmaking, whether rulemaking or adjudication, save those
situations when the agency seeks to impose a sanction for past conduct
or when the Constitution forbids such an informal process. 102 In these
latter two instances, and in only these instances, Verkuil calls for the
employment of trial-type hearing procedures. 0 3 Verkuil recognizes the
current inadequacies of notice and comment rulemaking,'°4 and indeed
his new APA would codify much of the "hybrid rulemaking" case law.
He would prohibit use of trial-type procedures in rulemaking, however,
and permit the use of oral presentation or cross-examination only when
a rulemaker found such techniques necessary or desirable.' 5
Dean Carl Auerbach has proposed a more modest legislative ap-
proach which would supplement the rulemaking provisions of the APA
with a requirement that persons seeking judicial review of rules
promulgated under notice and comment rulemaking first be required to
file a protest against the rule with the agency.0 6 Under this "protest
98. See, e.g., Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 345 n.2, 349
(2d Cir. 1973); Verkuil, supra note 19, at 317.
99. Verkuil, supra note 19, at 310-11, 320.
100. Id at 322-24.
101. Id
102. Id at 321.
103. Id
104. Id at 323, 327.
105. Id at 323.
106. See Auerbach, Informal Rule Making: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative
Procedures and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. RFv. 15, 61-68 (1977).
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procedure" the agency would then be required to conduct a trial-type,
on-the-record hearing on the issues raised by the protestor.10
7
Auerbach's proposal is designed to preserve the advantages of informal
rulemaking, while providing reviewing courts with an adequate record
in those instances when judicial review of an agency's rule is sought. 108
While he seems to feel that his "protest procedure" could be adopted as
a procedural rule by all rulemakers without necessarily amending the
APA, the proposal, nonetheless, would drastically alter the informal
rulemaking process and effectively eliminate formal rulemaking. 10 9
Thus, adoption of the proposal is perhaps best accomplished by revis-
ing the APA and, where necessary, the organic statutes of agencies.
Professor Nathanson continues in his belief that the Supreme Court
has long been laboring under a mistaken interpretation of the APA's
formal and informal rulemaking provisions." 0 He has suggested a lim-
ited amendment to the APA which would make clear that "rules which
must be reviewed on the administrative record are also 'required to be
made on the record' within the meaning of the APA."' The gist of
Professor Nathanson's proposal seems to be that a "correct" interpreta-
tion of the APA would require a more frequent use of the on-the-rec-
ord rulemaking procedures of sections 553, 556, and 557V12 Thus, his
amendment would overrule the Supreme Court's famous Florida East
Coast" 3 decision, which sharply limits the use of formal rulemaking,
while making clear that on-the-record rulemaking need not necessarily
entail the trappings of a trial-type hearing." 4 The practical effect of
this amendment would be to codify much of the hybrid rulemaking
case law developed by reviewing courts prior to Vermont Yankee. Pro-
fessor Nathanson's proposal seeks to correct what he perceives as a ser-
107. Id at 61.
108. Id
109. See id at 66, 68.
110. See Nathanson, supra note 7, at 183; see also Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee
on Ex Parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L. REv. 377, 407 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Report on Ex Parte Communications]; Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the
Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards ofJudicial Review under the Administrative Pro.
cedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 721, 724-40 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Nathanson, Probing the Mind]; Report of Judicial Review Committee of Admin. L. Section, Re-
cent Developments in Interpretation ofthe APA: Florida East Coast and its Progeny, 28 AD. L.
REV. 377 (1976).
111. Nathanson, supra note 7, at 203.
112. See id at 189-99; see also Nathanson, Probing the Mind, supra note 110, at 724-33.
113. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
114. See Nathanson, supra note 7, at 204.
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ious flaw in the interpretation of the current APA and, in so doing, to
insure the adequacy of the rulemaking record and both the fairness and
the procedural efficiency of agency rulemaking.
Judge Scalia and Professor Gifford doubt that Congress could ever
construct a single procedure which would meet all the current objec-
tions to informal administrative rulemaking. 15 If, as Judge Scalia be-
lieves, procedural requirements are basically imposed by Congress to
restrict the political power of rulemakers, an amended APA should
contain "not merely three, but ten or fifteen basic procedural formats,"
allowing Congress to select a format which would best suit its political
expectations for a particular administrative agency. 1 6 Professor Gif-
ford's revisions of the APA also would establish several rulemaking
models, each reflecting a typical variation in the organizational dynam-
ics of agency rulemaking. This would allow Congress to specify, with
more precision than is now possible, the procedural framework best
suited to assure efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness in a particular
rulemaking context."17
Though each of these proposals for amendment to the APA may
have its own merits and flaws, there is a basic inadequacy which
plagues them all-a dependence on congressional initiative. Legisla-
tive action may be an effective and legitimate way to restore the norma-
tive balance to rulemaking procedure set askew by Vermont Yankee,
but the last four Congresses have all failed in attempts to reform regu-
latory practice and amend the APA.118 Notwithstanding the argument
that substantial amendment to the APA is unnecessary," 9 if the last
eight years are any indication, the likelihood of APA amendment in the
foreseeable future is far from assured.
Professor Byse's views on procedural review of rulemaking present a
second approach to the question. He advocates continued reliance on
agency discretion.' 20  While he concedes that the APA's informal
115. See Gifford, supra note 78, at 87 & n.1 10; Scalia, supra note 6, at 406.
116. Scalia, supra note 6, at 408.
117. See Gifford, supra note 78, at 87.
118. See, e.g., S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2718 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982);
S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S17770-71, 17772 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982); S. 2490,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 2201-05 (1978); S. 3297, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., 122 CONG.
REc. 10,430-36 (1976).
119. See Wright, supra note 29, at 397; see also Wright, Court of Appeals Review ofFederal
Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD. L. REV. 199 (1974).
120. Byse, supra note 88, at 1823-24.
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rulemaking procedures may sometimes prove inadequate, he nonethe-
less supports Vermont Yankee's restrictions on procedural review of
rulemaking. 12' Professor Byse suggests that there are both practical
and theoretical reasons for concluding that courts should not be per-
mitted to impose procedural requirements on rulemakers beyond those
specified in the APA. Initially he observes that, since the judiciary can
lay little claim to expertise in the design of rulemaking procedures, a
court's belief that a particular procedure may somehow be "better"
than the one chosen by the agency may be wrong.122 Byse would put
more faith in agency personnel, whose responsibilities and experience
offer greater assurance for procedural adequacy. 23
More important for Byse, however, is his belief that procedural re-
view by courts is both unauthorized and unwise. Noting that the legis-
lative history of the APA leaves many procedural choices to the
discretion of the agency,' 24 he fears that judicial usurpation of that dis-
cretion will seriously undermine the integrity of the administrative pro-
cess. 125 He does not agree that judicial imposition of extra procedures
is necessary to improve either the effectiveness of rulemaking or the
substantive judicial review of that rulemaking. 26 Rather, he suggests
that when a court lacks the data it needs to judge the substantive ra-
tionality of an agency's rule, or when careful judicial scrutiny of the
substantive aspects of a rule reveals a less than rigorous analysis of the
problem by the agency, the courts should vacate the rule or remand to
the agency for further explanation or consideration. 27 Such a remand,
reminiscent of that employed by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery
Corp.'21 (Chenery 1), should induce agencies to use whatever further
procedures they choose to resolve the substantive problems which have
triggered the remand. 29 In this way, the courts still can satisfy them-
selves that rulemakers have taken a "hard-look" at the issues, while
preserving the agency's discretion to choose a procedural format best
suited to "the substantive issues involved and the agency's institutional
121. Id
122. Id at 1828.
123. See id
124. Id at 1829.
125. See id at 1828, 1831-32.
126. Id at 1826-29.
127. Id at 1827 (quoting Williams, supra note 43, at 454-55).
128. SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
129. See Byse, supra note 88, at 1827.
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capacities."' 130
However, once one concedes the current inadequacies of notice and
comment rulemaking, as Byse does, the Chenery I approach hardly
seems to presage any real improvement in the relationship between
rulemakers and reviewing courts. Byse's approach fails to provide re-
viewing courts with any guidelines for deciding whether an agency's
rulemaking record is substantively adequate or must instead be supple-
mented on remand. Courts therefore would be free to remand or va-
cate agency action on an ad hoc basis, but now for substantive as
opposed to procedural reasons. Additionally, it is hard to see any real
difference between a Chenery I remand and a remand for a more defi-
nite statement of the basis and purpose of the rule. If the latter is to be
considered inappropriate as a judicial expansion of the APA's proce-
dural requirements, 3 ' should not a Chenery I remand suffer the same
opprobrium? Absent some post hoc rationalization by the rulemaker, a
Chenery I remand is likely to induce the agency to reopen the proceed-
ings to resolve the uncertainties which led to the remand. As a conse-
quence, a Chenery I remand may well, in many instances, simply be a
disguised remand for additional agency procedures, but one which fails
to offer any helpful indication as to how the agency might resolve the
court's substantive problems with the rule.
Professor Byse's approach to judicial review of rulemaking also fails
to promote the procedural values which underlie notice and comment
rulemaking. Certainly agency accountability is not adequately insured.
A Chenery I remand for further consideration or explanation does not
guarantee that the agency will organize the rulemaking record into a
manageable or useful tool for judicial review; it merely enlarges that
record. And where, as is frequently the case, unresolved factual issues
have frustrated judicial review, a Chenery I remand gives the agency
little direction as to how it might cure the obscurity in its rationale
which occasioned the remand. 132 Such a remand may instead prompt
an agency response which merely exacerbates the factual uncertainty
rather than resolve it. 133
It has been noted that judicial review for rational decisions is no sub-
130. See Williams, supra note 46, at 455.
131. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 395.
132. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1818-19.
133. See Williams, supra note 43, at 425.
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stitute for rational decisionmaking processes.' 34 If that is true, Profes-
sor Byse's preference for an exclusively substantive judicial review of
rulemaking, even when coupled with the threat of a Chenery I remand,
provides only an indirect and inadequate inducement for the employ-
ment of effective rulemaking procedures. As others have pointed out,
the Chenery I technique is certainly of little assistance to a party who
has raised a factual challenge to an agency rule during judicial review,
only to find on remand that the controversy is mooted by the belated
production of data which the agency possessed from the beginning. 135
Such a waste of time, money, and effort on the part of all concerned
seems unavoidable unless agencies can be prompted to employ
rulemaking procedures which allow for public participation in the eval-
uation of rulemaking data in the first place. To that end, even Profes-
sor Williams, from whom Byse derived his approach,1 36 and who also
doubts the wisdom of an intensive procedural review of rulemaking,
has recognized the occasional need for judicial remands which give the
agency a clear indication that further procedures may be necessary to
resolve the substantive inadequacies in a rule.137 Williams has even
suggested that such remands might require the use of cross-examina-
tion to clarify substantive uncertainties. 138 In the end it seems clear
that absent the deterrent of some procedural scrutiny by courts, there is
very little assurance that agencies will structure rulemaking proceed-
ings to inform and educate themselves effectively, as the drafters of the
APA intended.
Like the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee, Professor Byse gives
little consideration to the notion that rulemaking procedures should be
responsive to concerns for fairness. While his approach might induce
procedural choices on the part of the agency which assist judicial re-
view of agency rules, it fails to bring even indirect pressure on agencies
to consider the openness, impartiality, and responsiveness of rulemak-
ing procedures. To the extent that fairness, or just its appearance,
might require increased public access to public rulemaking data, some
opportunity for rebuttal, or even an evaluative process free of question-
able influences, Byse's approach would place all trust in the procedural
134. W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 43 (1941).
135. See Williams, supra note 43, at 425.
136. Byse, supra note 88, at 1827.
137. See Wiiams, supra note 43, at 455.
138. Id at 444-46.
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discretion of the agency. Unfortunately, such trust is difficult to accord
given the number of recent experiences which cast doubt on the will-
ingness or ability of agencies to exercise that discretion in a politic
fashion. 39
A third response to Vermont Yankee has come from a group of com-
mentators who seem to feel that reviewing courts should, or at least
will, limit, distinguish or simply ignore the basic thrust of Vermont Yan-
kee and continue to impose procedural requirements upon rulemakers
which go beyond those outlined in the APA. Some, like Professors Da-
vis and Stewart, have strenuously objected to the Supreme Court's at-
tempt to exclude the judiciary from the development of the procedural
law of rulemaking.140 Their protests are based upon the belief that pro-
cedural "adequacy" in rulemaking simply cannot be assured by relying
exclusively on congressional or administrative initiative, as Vermont
Yankee would seem to require. 14 1 Rather, continued judicial supervi-
sion of rulemaking procedures is needed to preserve flexibility in meet-
ing the varied demands of specific rulemaking contexts, to provide
valuable experience upon which subsequent legislative action can be
based, or just to insure that procedural innovation is not frustrated by
congested congressional dockets or administrative inertia.' 42
Professor Davis has called upon reviewing courts to reject Vermont
Yankee and has instructed them in ways to escape, at least in the short
run, the literal commands of the case.' 43 He is confident that, in the
long run, Vermont Yankee will be repudiated and reviewing courts will
then be able to rely upon "administrative common law" as a justifica-
tion for the judicial imposition of whatever procedures are considered
necessary to insure procedural fairness and effectiveness. 144 Unfortu-
nately, this notion of an "administrative common law" has so far
eluded any clear definition. 145 Perhaps that is the idea. But without
some further delineation of its source and scope, reliance upon such an
amorphous concept does not appear to advance the argument, and may
139. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 536-37 (D.C. Cir.), cer.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 387-91 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
States Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 584 F.2d 519, 537-38 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
140. See Davis, supra note 7, at 6; Stewart, supra note 7, at 1819.
141. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1819.
142. See id at 1820.
143. See Davis, supra note 7, at 15-16.
144. See id at 3-10.
145. See id at 3-7.
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suffer from the same lack of legitimacy Davis predicts for Vermont
Yankee.
Professor Stewart also has urged the courts to take a narrow view of
Vermont Yankee. 46 He has counseled them to seize upon the Supreme
Court's recognition of the need for a "rulemaking record" in informal
rulemaking as justification for the imposition of "paper hearing" proce-
dures.1 47 These procedures would include detailed notices of proposed
rules, expansive public access to agency data on the proposed rule, the
opportunity to comment on both the agency's proposal and supporting
data, as well as the comments of others, and a comprehensive explana-
tion of the agency's final decision. 148 Compliance with such procedures
would, in Stewart's view, not only provide courts with adequate records
for responsible substantive review, but also improve the quality of
agency decisionmaking without hampering the efficiency of the
rulemaking process.
149
While Stewart's proposed format surely provides a plausible and rea-
sonable solution to many of the problems identified with notice and
comment rulemaking procedures,'5 ° some questions still remain. For
example, Stewart seems to base his "paper hearing" requirements ex-
clusively on the need to insure accountability in rulemaking, focusing
primarily on the needs of courts conducting responsible review of
agency rulemaking. He does not, however, discuss other procedural
values which might either provide an additional basis for his sugges-
tions or justify the imposition of further rulemaking procedures.
Would a perceived need to insure effective and fair rulemaking call for
the occasional imposition of oral hearings or cross-examination, even
when such procedures would not necessarily assist a court's substantive
review? And what is the source of the courts' power to impose these
"paper hearing" requirements? Reliance upon Vermont Yankee's ap-
parent endorsement of the requirement of a "rulemaking record''
merely begs the question. Why must a rulemaker provide the court
with an adequate record? The APA does not, at least on its face, re-
146. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1821.
147. Id
148. See id at 1813 n.36.
149. See id at 1813-14.
150. Compare Stewart's "paper hearing" procedures, id, with the proposed minimum
rulemaking procedures outlined and discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 284-395.
151. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 547-49 (1978).
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quire such a record.'52 Even conceding the contradiction in Vermont
Yankee's recognition of the need for a "rulemaking record" not man-
dated by the APA, the case nonetheless demands that the judicial im-
position of rulemaking procedures be based either upon the APA or
some acceptable limitation on the procedural discretion of the
agency. 53 If judicial imposition of "paper hearing" procedures is to
survive Vermont Yankee, there must be some further explanation as to
how these procedures are linked to the APA or the procedural discre-
tion of the rulemaker. It may well be that a failure to provide a "paper
hearing" constitutes an abuse of a rulemaker's procedural discretion. If
so, such an approach provides a more satisfying basis for procedural
innovation than a fortuitous contradiction on the part of the Vermont
Yankee Court. But it also leaves unanswered the question of how
other procedural values, beyond agency accountability, should inform
a rulemaker's procedural discretion.
Commentary by Judges Skelly Wright and Antonin Scalia has de-
scribed still another method for judicial imposition of rulemaking pro-
cedures which might well survive the proscriptions of Vermont
Yankee.' 54 Both Wright and Scalia observe that some courts in the
past have sought to alleviate the inadequacies of notice and comment
rulemaking by simply giving an expansive interpretation to the statu-
tory requirements of the APA.'"1 In effect, this approach to judicial
review of rulemaking procedures would be grounded on a functional or
instrumental interpretation of the notice, comment, and explanation re-
quirements of the APA's informal rulemaking provisions.
Under this approach, the requirement of section 553 that the notice
of proposed rulemaking include "either the terms or substance of the
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved"'56
would be interpreted broadly to require public disclosure of all of the
data upon which the agency intends to rely in the rulemaking proceed-
152. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); see Stewart, supra note 7, at 1816.
153. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 548 (1978).
154. Scalia, supra note 6, at 394-96; see generally Wright, New Judicial Requisitesfor Informal
Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 AD. L. REv. 59
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Wright, Informal Rulemaking]; Wright, supra note 119; Wright, supra
note 29.
155. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 394-95; Wright, supra note 29, at 380.
156. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1982).
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ing.157 In addition, Judge Wright would read the APA's notice provi-
sions to require an initial exposition of the agency's thinking on the
basis and purpose of the rule in light of the agency's current data base,
followed by continuous disclosure of new data as it is accumulated by
the agency.158 He also seems to feel that the concept of fair notice re-
quires that certain substantial alterations in a rulemaking proposal,
perhaps in response to public comment, should be prefaced by a second
round of public comment. 15 9 But while Judge Wright would interpret
the APA to require a "genuine dialogue between agency experts and
concerned members of the public,"1 60 he would not read the APA as a
basis for the required use of oral argument or cross-examination in
rulemaking.16' Scalia, on the other hand, has suggested that "there
may even be room for relatively brazen distortions [of the APA] such as
the judicial importation of cross-examination requirements, where an
ancient and well-established adjudicatory issue has been kidnapped
into rulemaking."162 Both Wright and Scalia have also noted the grow-
ing tendency among reviewing courts to read the APA's call for a "con-
cise general statement" of a final rule's basis and purpose quite
broadly, requiring a comprehensive and reasoned explanation of the
agency's entire decisionmaking process and an articulation of the
agency's response to substantial public criticism of its reasoning or its
rule.163
Absent some congressional action on the APA's rulemaking provi-
sions or the even more improbable overruling of case precedent re-
stricting judicial imposition of the APA's trial-type rulemaking
procedures, 164 an instrumental interpretation of the APA's notice and
comment rulemaking procedures provides a simple, expeditious, and
sensible answer to the current procedural inadequacies of informal
rulemaking. The approach remains true to the Supreme Court's reluc-
157. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 380-81 & n.154, 394; Wright, supra note 119, at 204; Wright,
supra note 29, at 380.
158. See Wright, supra note 29, at 380-81.
159. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1225-26 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Wright, CJ.) (suggesting that substantial revisions in a proposed rule may trigger the need for a
second round of public comment), cert. denied 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
160. Wright, supra note 29, at 381.
161. Id at 381-82.
162. Scalia, supra note 6, at 395.
163. See id at 394-95, Wright, supra note 29, at 381.
164. E.g., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. Alle-
gheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
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tance to revitalize formal rulemaking,1 61 its obsession with the notion
that the APA is some sort of procedural constitution, 166 and its demand
for statutory authority for procedural innovation in rulemaking. 167 Yet
Wright and Scalia have suggested an approach to the APA that re-
sponds to the need for a rulemaking procedure which more closely re-
flects both the practical and political realities of the modem
rulemaking context. An expansive judicial construction of the notice,
comment, and explanation requirements found in the APA would add
a measure of fairness to rulemaking and should increase both the effec-
tiveness and accountability of a decisionmaking process currently far
too concerned with procedural efficiency.' 68
To be fully effective, however, this approach to judicial review of
rulemaking procedures needs further development than that found in
the comments and observations of Judges Wright and Scalia. To be
fair, neither author has specifically advocated a comprehensive recon-
struction of section 553. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that either
would welcome such a development. 169 As a consequence, their spe-
cific suggestions have been somewhat narrow, even though their ap-
proach would seem to have much broader procedural implications.
Might it not be possible, for example, to interpret section 553 in such a
way as to provide for a public rulemaking docket and a right to rebut-
tal, to require that ex parte contacts in rulemaking be noted and dock-
eted, or to require the completion and organization of a "rulemaking
record"?' 7° If, as all but the Supreme Court seem to recognize, notice
and comment rulemaking was never intended to be employed with the
scope and breadth of current practice, contemporaneous judicial inter-
pretation of the APA seems necessary to insure that its procedures will
remain viable and legitimate regulatory tools. A judicial interpretation
of the procedural requirements of notice and comment rulemaking
which gives life to the procedural values that prompted the drafters of
the rulemaking sections of the APA seems a reasonable step toward
accommodating rulemaking to its modern regulatory tasks, a step
which should be acceptable even to the Vermont Yankee Court.
165. See cases citedsupra note 164.
166. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 523 (1978); Scalia, supra note 6, at 375-82.
167. 435 U.S. at 548.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 284-396.
169. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 366-69; Wright, supra note 29, at 381.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 284-396.
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B. From the Courts
The judicial response to Vermont Yankee is more difficult to charac-
terize than the academic reaction. Notwithstanding the protests of
some dissenting opinions, 171 it is probably fair to say that no court has
taken express exception to Vermont Yankee and deliberately violated
the Supreme Court's ban on judicial imposition of extra-statutory
rulemaking provisions. It is certainly clear, however, that a number of
courts disagree with the Court's approach to judicial review of agency
rulemaking procedures. 171 It is equally true that few, if any, courts
have adhered strictly to the letter of Vermont Yankee's admonition, and
flatly refused even to entertain requests for rulemaking procedures
which go beyond those specifically outlined in the APA. 173 Instead,
though somewhat more reluctant to find fatal procedural error in
agency rulemaking, 174 reviewing courts have continued to engage in
careful, searching analysis of claims that agencies have somehow failed
to utilize procedures which guarantee a fair, effective, or accountable
rulemaking process.
75
After Vermont Yankee, very few courts have found it necessary to set
aside informal agency action for failure to employ cross-examination,
oral argument, or similar trial-type procedures. 176 And Vermont Yan-
kee probably has stifled the judicial imposition of other procedures
that might well have been found indispensable to "fair and reasoned
decisionmaking" in the pre-Vermont Yankee era.177 By and large,
171. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 685 F.2d 459, 517, 535, 536 &
n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
172. See, e.g., National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also McGowan, supra note 7, at 689; Wald, supra
note 50, at 140.
173. See American Mining Congress v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251, 1260 (10th Cir. 1982).
174. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 536 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1207, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913
(1981).
175. See, eg., National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 428-30, 451-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Association of Nat'1 Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1979); BASF Wyandotte
Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641 (Ist Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,
1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
176. See, e.g., Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Illinois v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981).
177. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United Steelworkers v.
Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Lead Indus. Ass'n v.
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however, the effect of Vermont Yankee on judicial review of informal
rulemaking procedures has truly been "modest." '178 Reviewing courts
have paid lip service to the proscriptions of Vermont Yankee, but many
have effectively ignored the spirit of the opinion's expansive dictum on
procedural review.' 79 When confronted with procedural challenges to
rulemaking the courts seem to operate on the implicit assumption that
literal compliance with the procedural dictates of the APA simply is not
adequate to insure legitimate agency rulemaking. 180 As a result, many
courts have continued to engage in a procedural review of informal
rulemaking more demanding than that outlined in Vermont Yankee. 181
Deftly maneuvering around or beyond the Supreme Court's formula
for procedural review, a number of courts, employing a variety of tech-
niques, have continued to impose procedures upon rulemakers which
exceed those of the APA. 182 Other courts, ultimately satisfied with the
agency's performance, have nonetheless rejected procedural challenges
to rulemaking only after concluding that the agency had met proce-
dural requirements that cannot be found in the APA.183
Cautioned against the imposition of extra-statutory rulemaking pro-
cedures by Vermont Yankee, some courts have responded by finding
that an agency's organic statute requires the use of rulemaking proce-
dures more elaborate than the APA's notice and comment rulemaking
format. For example, in United States Lines v. FMC,184 a case decided
EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d
91 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
178. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 77 (Supp.
1982).
179. See, e.g., Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Sierra Club v. Costle, 654 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d
416 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States
Lines v. FMC, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also S. BREYER & R. STEWART, .supra note 178,
at 78 & n.78c.
180. See, e.g., Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 343 (1982); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 79 (1982); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
181. See supra note 175.
182. See, e.g., Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Illinois v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627
F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
183. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United Steelworkers v. Mar-
shall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied. 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
184. 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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soon after Vermont Yankee, Judge Skelly Wright seized upon a statu-
tory requirement that the agency act only after "notice and hearing" to
sustain an attack on the adequacy of the agency's procedures. Judge
Wright was troubled by the agency's failure to subject data upon which
it had relied to "meaningful adversarial comment" and by the presence
of "secret exparte contacts" during the decisionmaking process. Upon
analysis he found such practices inconsistent with the congressional
"hearing" requirement."8 5 If the hearing was to be fair, such practices
simply could not be tolerated.18 6 While Judge Wright employed a
number of other, perhaps more controversial, rationales for finding
procedural error,18 7 it is significant that he chose to reconcile his re-
mand with Vermont Yankee on the ground that "the freedom of admin-
istrative agencies to fashion their own procedures . . . does not
encompass freedom to ignore statutory requirements."'' 88
A number of courts faced with challenges to the scant procedural
protections of the APA have explored this loophole in the Vermont
Yankee opinion and found it to provide fertile ground for continued
judicial imposition of more elaborate rulemaking procedures.8 9 Of
course, the extent of this loophole, and thus the courts' ability to engage
in extensive procedural review, will vary from one organic statute to
the next. But vague statutory requirements that the rulemaker hold a
"hearing," a "public hearing," or provide a "statement of reasons"
should provide ample opportunity for judicial creativity. 90
Even where Congress has constructed elaborate rulemaking schemes
which go far beyond those of the APA, courts have not hesitated to
plug procedural gaps which threaten the fairness, effectiveness, or ac-
185. Id at 535-37.
186. Id
187. See, for example, the court's reference to the need for adversarial comment as a key to
effective judicial review and its reliance on some, apparently nonconstitutional, undefined notion
of fairness as bases for its procedural remand. Id at 534-36.
188. Id at 542 n.63.
189. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA,
647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v.
FTC, 617 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
190. There may already be some limitations on what procedures a court may impose by inter-
pretation of the agency's organic statute given the Supreme Court's reluctance to countenance
frequent invocation of the APA's formal rulemaking procedures. See United States v. Florida E.
Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). But, as Judge Scalia has noted, this "loophole" in the Vermont
Yankee proscriptions on procedural review is one which only can be narrowed by the Court on a
"case-by-case" basis. Scalia, supra note 6, at 396.
[Vol. 61:891
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/1
INFORMAL RULEMAKING
countability of the rulemaking process. In Sierra Club v. Costle,'91 the
court sought to protect the "integrity" of the rulemaking process by
holding the agency to rulemaking procedures specifically outlined in
the Clean Air Act or "glean[ed] by inference from the procedural
framework provided in the statute."' 92 Though the court ultimately re-
jected the procedural attacks leveled at the EPA's notice of proposed
rulemaking, its acceptance of comments filed after the close of the offi-
cial comment period, and its post-comment meetings with non-agency
personnel, it did so only after assuring itself that the agency had not
violated procedural standards which were "reasonably inferable from
[the statutory procedures] or from basic notions of constitutional due
process." 193
Other courts, apparently finding resort to the agency's organic statute
unavailing, have resorted to Vermont Yankee's own formula for judi-
cial imposition of extra-statutory rulemaking procedures. As noted
earlier, the Supreme Court's restrictions on procedural review of infor-
mal rulemaking do not prevent a court from requiring procedures
which may be mandated by either constitutional concerns or "ex-
tremely compelling circumstances."' 194 While a few courts have ven-
tured into the murky waters of these vague exceptions, the results have
done little to clarify their content.
In Association of National Advertisers v. FTC,'9 5 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reversed a district court ruling dis-
qualifying Commissioner Michael Pertschuk from participation in an
FTC rulemaking proceeding on grounds of bias. While the court re-
fused to find that Commissioner Pertschuk's pre-rulemaking conduct
required his recusal from the upcoming rulemaking proceeding, it
nonetheless held that participants in all agency rulemaking proceedings
have a "right to fair and open proceedings [and] that right includes
access to an impartial decisionmaker."' 96 Unable to find such a proce-
dural guarantee in either the APA' 97 or the FTC's organic statute,198
191. 647 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
192. Id at 396-97.
193. Id at 392.
194. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 543 (1978).
195. 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
196. Id at 1174.
197. Id at 1168-69 & n.39; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); see also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130, 1179 & n.151 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
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the court concluded that due process mandated a rulemaking proceed-
ing free from decisional bias. Though the court was acutely aware that
rulemakers could not be held to the same standards of neutrality ex-
pected of administrative adjudicators and judges, it found that due pro-
cess required the recusal of a rulemaker clearly and convincingly
shown to have "an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the
disposition of the proceeding."' 199
This constitutional test for bias in rulemakers has been utilized in a
number of other cases since Vermont Yankee,2° continuing the confus-
ing practice of some reviewing courts of resorting to constitutional stan-
dards when examining rulemaking procedures.2° ' It has long been a
central premise of administrative law that due process has little, if any,
relevance to the procedural aspects of informal rulemaking.0 2 Even
Vermont Yankee's reference to constitutional constraints on rulemak-
ing was limited to those rare situations in which an agency seeks to
disguise an adjudicative purpose in legislative garb.20 Yet both before
and after Vermont Yankee, reviewing courts repeatedly have resorted
to "basic notions of due process ' '204 when called upon to resolve certain
procedural challenges to informal rulemaking. Unfortunately, none of
these courts have ever offered a clear explanation of exactly when and
how procedural due process might serve to constrain informal agency
rulemakers. Is there, for example, some minimum constitutional stan-
198. While the court noted that it had to devise and apply a standard for disqualification
which was "consistent with the structure and purposes of section 18 [of the Magnuson-Moss Act],"
627 F.2d at 1166, its focus on the agency proceeding as a non-formal rulemaking proceeding
rather than some sort of suigeneris type of agency proceeding, id at 1166-70, gives its opinion
precedential value beyond the context of FTC "hybrid" rulemaking.
199. Id at 1170.
200. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1172-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1042 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1208-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
201. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977); O'DonneU v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449
F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 843 (1966).
202. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 392
n.462 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
203. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 542 (1978).
204. See cases cited supra notes 195, 200 & 201. See also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,
392 (D.C. Cir. 1981); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC, 590 F.2d 345
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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dard of fair play which must guide administrative rulemakers? Absent
a more definitive statement by the Supreme Court concerning the exist-
ence or scope of any such constitutional restraints on agency
rulemakers, it appears that resort to due process may well provide re-
viewing courts with yet another rationale for the imposition of extra-
statutory rulemaking procedures in the post-Vermont Yankee era.205
Only a very few cases have explored the Supreme Court's concession
in Vermont Yankee that "extremely rare. . .[and] compelling circum-
stances"2"6 might well justify the judicial imposition of extra-statutory
procedures. While none of these cases provides guidelines as to the full
scope of this exception, the courts have interpreted it to allow for re-
mands to agency decisionmakers when the procedures chosen by the
agency undermine the courts' ability to conduct an effective substantive
review of an agency's decision." 7
In Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Committee v. Lewis,2"' the D.C.
Circuit reviewed an informal adjudication by the Maritime Adminis-
tration (MarAd) lifting certain competitive restrictions on the use of a
merchant marine vessel constructed with government subsidies. While
purporting to find substantive flaws in MarAd's action, the court's deci-
sion setting aside the agency's order was primarily based on procedural
grounds.2"9 Despite the inapplicability of the APA,21 ° the lack of any
statutorily mandated procedures,21' and "the Supreme Court's dictum
in [Vermont Yankee] that courts may not add to the procedural require-
ments of the APA except in 'extremely rare circumstances,' ""2 the
court nonetheless felt "justified in demanding some sort of procedures
for notice and comment and a statement of reasons as a necessary
means of carrying out [its] responsibility for a thorough and searching
205. See supra note 204; see also Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
206. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 524, 543 (1978).
207. See, e.g., Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Illinois v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980). See also National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627
F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
208. 690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
209. Id at 926-31.
210. Id at 922.
211. Id
212. Id at 923.
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review. '213 The court noted that "some minimum procedures are nec-
essary to provide a record adequate for the court to perform its re-
view." '214 The court went on to find MarAd's failure to disclose staff
reports upon which it had relied and its failure to provide an adequate
explanation for its decision to be "totally unacceptable." '215 Citing the
benefits of adversarial comment to judicial review of agency action and
informed agency decisionmaking,216 the court directed the agency to
"permit a new round of comments [on the previously undisclosed data]
and publish a thorough and reasoned explanation for whatever deci-
sion is reached. 217
In Illinois v. United States,21 8 the Seventh Circuit also had occasion
to apply Vermont Yankee's "extremely compelling circumstances" ex-
ception in reviewing an informal ICC adjudication on the abandon-
ment of a railroad line. Like the D.C. Circuit in Tanker Owners
Committee, the Seventh Circuit concluded that its own needs as a re-
viewing court justified a judicial remand for further procedures. The
court held that the ICC had abused its procedural discretion in refusing
to allow the parties the right of cross-examination with regard to cer-
tain supplementary data provided to the agency.219 The court based its
action primarily upon the fact that authorized cross-examination of
similar evidence presented at an initial hearing on the matter had thor-
oughly discredited that evidence, and upon the fact that the ICC had
given no indication as to why mere written procedures were sufficient
to resolve serious questions about the reliability of the newly received
evidence. The unique circumstances and adjudicative nature of Illinois
v. United States probably serve to limit its precedential value. But it
nonetheless stands as an example of how courts may interpret the "ex-
tremely compelling circumstances" exception to Vermont Yankee in the
context of agency rulemaking. The court remanded for cross-examina-
tion with respect to certain factual issues, noting that "[o]nly by know-
ing that the parties here had the opportunity for cross-examination, can
a reviewing court be assured that the ICC was relying on permissible
213. I1d
214. Id at 922.
215. Id at 926.
216. Id at 925-26.
217. Id at 931.
218. 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981).
219. Id at 1083.
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evidence."22
An interpretation of the "compelling circumstances" exception
which focuses on the relationship between the procedures used by an
agency to resolve certain types of issues and the needs of reviewing
courts was also suggested by Judge Skelly Wright in an earlier case
involving agency rulemaking. In Lead Industries Association, Inc. v.
EPA,221 Judge Wright rejected an argument that compelling circum-
stances justified judicial remand to the EPA for cross-examination of
medical and scientific witnesses who had testified in support of pro-
posed air quality standards. The petitioner had argued that "in some
situations 'cross-examination of live witnesses on a subject of critical
importance which could not be adequately ventilated under the general
procedures' may be appropriate even though not required by stat-
ute." '222 Petitioners sought to supplement the agency's rulemaking rec-
ord with additional information presenting a rebutting view on the
technical issues, presumably in an effort to create some doubt in the
mind of the reviewing court as to the reliability or sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the EPA's new standards. The court rejected peti-
tioner's request on the basis of legislative history reflecting "Congress'
judgment that the crucial issues in these standard-setting proceedings
can be 'adequately ventilated' without providing an opportunity for
cross-examination." 223 The court went on to assume, however, albeit
only "for purposes of argument," 224 that the need to enhance the
rulemaking record on certain issues might constitute an "extremely
compelling circumstance" justifying the judicial requirement of cross-
examination.225 While Judge Wright ultimately concluded that peti-
tioner had failed to demonstrate the necessity for cross-examination
given the broad comment and rebuttal opportunities actually afforded,
his willingness to entertain such an argument is significant. Would the
absence of similar comment and rebuttal procedures permit reviewing
courts to require cross-examination on crucial factual issues in order to
insure an adequate record for judicial review of an agency's rule?
If these three cases are any indication of how the courts are going to
220. Id
221. 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
222. Id at 1169 (citing International Harvester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)).
223. Id at 1170.
224. Id
225. Id at 1170-71 & n.120.
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construe the "compelling circumstances" exception to the restrictive
dicta of Vermont Yankee, it may well be that the exception is destined
to swallow the "rule" of Vermont Yankee. The opinions in all three
cases bear a striking resemblance to many decisions of the last decade
which relied solely upon judicial perceptions of the need to insure ef-
fective judicial review as justification for the imposition of extra-statu-
tory procedures.226  The "rule" of Vermont Yankee was specifically
aimed at discrediting such a free-wheeling approach to procedural re-
view of informal agency action.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Vermont Yankee may well have inad-
vertently opened the door to yet another avenue of escape from its limi-
tations on procedural review. While Vermont Yankee places severe
restrictions on the ability of reviewing courts to order the use of
rulemaking procedures in excess of congressional requirements, it
nonetheless reconfirms the duty of courts to remand rules which lack
sufficient substantive justification to be valid exercises of agency au-
thority. ' 7 Such substantive remands are often prompted by the inabil-
ity of a reviewing court to find adequate support in the rulemaking
record for the agency's findings and conclusions.22 Thus, after Ver-
mont Yankee, courts have remanded agency rules when, in one student
commentator's words:
(1) [the rulemaking record] does not specifically respond to the chal-
lenger's criticisms, (2) ... does not provide adequate support for the rule,
(3) [when] the court needs a more complete record to understand the
agency's decisionmaking process, or (4) [when] the agency did not provide
all the information it relied on in the record.229
It has been suggested that such remands, though ostensibly substantive
in nature, and thus in conformity with Vermont Yankee, are primarily
226. See, ag., Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'dsub nom Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International
Harvester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
227. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 549 (1978).
228. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), a'd sub norn.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); Associated Indus, v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1979) (quoting
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973)); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 420 (1973).
229. Note, Counter Revolution in the Federal Courts of Appeal-The Aflermath of Vermont
Yankee, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 723, 730 (1981).
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intended to induce the use of further or different rulemaking proce-
dures which will supply the court with a "more adequate record" for
review."' Thus, the argument goes, courts which utilize such remands
are indirectly, but inevitably, imposing extra-statutory rulemaking pro-
cedures upon agencies in violation of Vermont Yankee.2 31 While it
probably goes too far to suggest that all such substantive remands actu-
ally represent instances of judicial dissatisfaction with agency proce-
dures, 2 there is certainly evidence that courts can utilize this
loophole231 in an effort to influence the procedural choices of
rulemakers.
One example of this type of remand is National Lime Association v.
EPA .234 In National Lime, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia remanded the EPA's air pollution emission limi-
tations for new lime manufacturing plants after finding "inadequate
support in the administrative record. 235 While the court's holding
seems substantive in nature, its opinion makes it very clear that the
court's difficulties with the rules stemmed primarily from perceived
shortcomings in the EPA's rulemaking procedures. After an extensive
discussion of the substantive problems with the rules, the court point-
edly noted that most of these substantive inadequacies could have been
avoided had the EPA's notice of proposed rulemaking been more com-
plete,2 36 its public hearing procedures more inquisitive,23 7 and its ex-
planation for the basis of the rules more responsive to public
comment.23 8 As it was, the EPA's failure to develop a rulemaking rec-
ord containing adequate data, analysis, and explanation led the court
to conclude that the rulemaking process had been "arbitrary" 239 and
far from the "reasoned decisionmaking" expected of rulemakers.240
The court's remand to the agency refrained from directly imposing any
230. Id See also Byse, supra note 87, at 1827; Williams, supra note 43, at 454.
231. See Note, supra note 229, at 732.
232. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Tamm, J., concurring), rev'd sub nor. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1979); cases cited supra note 228.
233. See Note, supra note 229, at 732.
234. 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
235. Id at 422.
236. Id at 434.
237. Id at 427 n.38, 442-43.
238. Id at 443, 453-54.
239. Id at 444.
240. Id at 430, 451-53 & n.126, 455.
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particular rulemaking procedure upon the EPA,2 4t and even acknowl-
edged that the agency could simply prepare a better explanation for the
substantive problems identified by the court.2 42 But the opinion
strongly and repeatedly suggests that the EPA's time would be better
spent in reopening the rulemaking proceeding rather than attempting
to justify the rules on the current state of the record.243
The court's holding in National Lime probably does fall technically
within the guidelines for judicial review established by the Supreme
Court in Vermont Yankee. The court did not, after all, require the use
of specific extra-statutory rulemaking procedures upon remand. But
the case so clearly links the substantive and procedural aspects of
rulemaking that the agency is given no choice but to review and revise
its procedural format upon remand in order to conform to the court's
notion of the appropriate rulemaking procedures. While the court os-
tensibly focuses on the substantive adequacy of the rulemaking record,
it clearly believes that this facet of a rulemaking record will be signifi-
cantly influenced by the procedures used to generate that record. The
existence of such a relationship between substance and procedure was
expressly rejected in Vermont Yankee, when the Court stated that "the
adequacy of the 'record' in this type of proceeding is not correlated
directly to the type of procedural devices employed."' 2 " Nonetheless,
the court in National Lime noted that its standard for judicial review of
rulemaking required a demonstration that the agency had taken a
"hard look" at the issues involved before promulgating its rules,24 - a
241. Id at 455.
242. Id at 434, 446, 455.
243. EPA had promulgated both a particulate emission and an opacity standard to govern
exhaust gas emissions from new or modified lime-manufacturing facilities. The court held that
there was inadequate support in the record to demonstrate that either standard could be achieved.
Id at 431, 434, 445, 449-50. In its remand the court suggested that neither standard could be
justified without "supplementary data," Id at 434, or some "amplification of the record," id at
449. Indeed, the court observed that its remand of the particulate emission standard would give
the EPA an "opportunity to consider the ... standard more fully in light of the additional mate-
rial and more elaborate arguments relating to the achievability of the standard. . . that were first
submitted. . . to this court." id at 446. Presumably the "consideration" was to take place in a
re-opened rulemaking proceeding. With respect to the opacity standard, the court's remand flatly
suggests a revision. Id The court's prescription for the "reasoned decisionmaking" it expected on
remand contained a number of procedural elements which EPA had failed to include in its origi-
nal rulemaking proceeding. Id at 442, 453.
244. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 547 (1978).
245. 627 F.2d at 451.
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"hard look" with both substantive and procedural requirements. Cit-
ing earlier cases reviewing administrative rulemaking under this "hard
look" standard, the court found
a [judicial] concern that variables be accounted for, that the representa-
tiveness of test conditions by [sic] ascertained, that the validity of the tests
be assured and the statistical significance of results determined. Collec-
tively, these concerns have sometimes been expressed as a need for "rea-
soned decision-making" and sometimes as a need for adequate
"methodology." However expressed, these more substantive concerns
have been coupled with a requirement that assumptions be stated, that
process be revealed, that the rejection of alternate theories or abandon-
ment of alternate courses of action be explained and that the rationale for
the ultimate decision be set forth in a manner which permits the public to
exercise its statutory prerogative of comment and the courts to exercise
their statutory responsibility upon review.
2 4 6
Such an approach to substantive judicial review of agency rulemak-
ing does not bode well for the rulemaker whose procedural choices
have merely tracked the statutory commands of the APA. Strictly in-
terpreted, section 553 simply does not require that the agency's notice
or explanation for informal rulemaking be as comprehensive or de-
tailed as the court in National Lime seems to demand. And if, as Na-
tional Lime suggests, rulemaking records must contain "sufficient data
to demonstrate a systematic approach to problems,"'247 it may well be
that this "hard look" substantive review will also force agencies to em-
ploy public comment procedures which enhance their ability to gather
and evaluate rulemaking data, procedures which go beyond the single
round of written comments mandated by the APA.2 4 8
In many ways the approach to judicial review of rulemaking taken
by National Lime resembles Professor Byse's suggestion that reviewing
courts employ a "hard look" substantive review coupled with a Chenery
I-type remand to induce the use of further agency-chosen procedures
rather than engage in a review which imposes judicially specified pro-
cedures.249 In National Lime, however, the court went beyond Profes-
sor Byse's suggestions and, in the course of its remand, attempted to
246. Id at 452-53.
247. Id at 454.
248. See, for example, the procedures outlined in the text accompanying notes 330-32 infra
See also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Williams,
supra note 43, at 445-56.
249. See Byse, supra note 88, at 1827.
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
938 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
provide the agency with some guidance as to the procedural improve-
ments which the court felt would help resolve the substantive problems
with the rule.25° This procedural addendum to a Chenery I-type re-
mand reflects a recognition of a functional relationship between the
substantive adequacy of a rulemaking record and the procedures cho-
sen to promulgate the rule, a relationship which Vermont Yankee
clearly rejects.25'
Even when coupled with procedural guidance, however, a response
to Vermont Yankee which places primary reliance on a "hard look"
substantive review fails to resolve some difficult issues. There are
those, for example, who feel that "hard look" substantive review repre-
sents an unwarranted intrusion into the discretion of administrative
agencies.2 52 These observers have called for a more deferential review
of substantive rulemaking issues.2 53 In addition, even assuming the le-
gitimacy of "hard look" substantive review, the courts employing this
type of analysis have failed to provide any clear and workable standard
for assessing the substantive adequacy of a rulemaking record, 54 rais-
ing the spectre of an ad hoc approach to review of agency rulemak-
ing.2 55 Finally, it is discomforting to embrace an approach to judicial
review of informal rulemaking which attempts to evade the strictures of
Vermont Yankee by disguising obvious procedural concerns in substan-
tive array. Surely the importance of the issues and problems raised by
Vermont Yankee's restrictions on judicial review of rulemaking re-
quires a more candid approach.
A number of other courts have taken Vermont Yankee at its word
that reviewing courts may always require agency compliance with the
APA's rulemaking provisions. 56 The issue for these courts is deter-
mining just what procedures are in fact required by the APA. These
courts take a "hard look" at the APAl, and, after examining its purposes
and goals, give its procedural requirements an expansive and more
250. 627 F.2d at 453.
251. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 547 (1978).
252. See, e.g., Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Contro.
versy, 91 HARv. L. Rnv. 1833, 1833, 1840 (1978); Verkuil, supra note 85, at 419, 424.
253. See supra note 252.
254. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 1819.
255. See id
256. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978).
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functional interpretation.257
This approach to procedural review of agency rulemaking is cer-
tainly not new. In the years preceding Vermont Yankee, several courts
took a broad view of the procedural requirements of the APA, 258 and
Vermont Yankee apparently has done little to abate judicial enthusi-
asm for this technique. Focusing on the notice requirements of section
553, post-Vermont Yankee courts have routinely interpreted the APA to
require detailed notices of proposed rulemaking, 2 9 agency disclosure
of significant post-notice data,2" public access to pertinent ex parte
communications, 26' and even a second round of public comment when
an agency intends to make some significant and unforeshadowed
change in its initial rulemaking proposal.262 Vermont Yankee has simi-
larly failed to deter courts from requiring that an agency's statement of
the basis and purpose of a rule present a clear, complete, and accurate
explanation of how the agency has resolved the factual, legal, and pol-
icy issues involved in the proceeding.263 While these interpretations of
the APA's informal rulemaking provisions certainly go beyond the lit-
eral commands of the statute, they have become accepted standards in
the continued judicial review of agency rulemaking procedures.264
The articulated justifications for these expansive judicial interpreta-
tions of the APA vary. Surprisingly few courts have sought support for
their constructions in the legislative history of the APA,265 though ar-
257. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
258. See, ag., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977);
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1974); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n
v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
259. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1221-27 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134, 144 & n.13 (Ist Cir. 1980).
260. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1028-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
261. See, e.g., National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC, 590 F.2d 345, 351
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States Lines v. FMC, 584 F.2d 519, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 659-61 (D.D.C. 1978).
262. See, e.g., BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 643-44 (1st Cir. 1979), cer.
denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
263. See, e.g., Action on Smoking & Health v. CAB, 699 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 79
(1982); PPG Indus. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462, 467 (6th Cir. 1980); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590
F.2d 1011, 1024 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1978).
264. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 394-96.
265. Compare Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing legislative
history of APA on purpose of public participation in rulemaking) and BASF Wyandotte Corp. v.
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guably such support is plentiful.26 6 Some courts find such broad inter-
pretations necessary to effectuate the purposes and goals of notice and
comment rulemaking. In Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. NRC,267
the D.C. Circuit defined the requirements of an adequate notice of pro-
posed rulemaking in very practical and functional terms, noting that
[tihe purpose of the comment period is to allow interested members of the
public to communicate information, concerns, and criticisms to the
agency during the rule-making process. If the notice of the proposed
rule-making fails to provide an accurate picture of the reasoning that has
led the agency to the proposed rule, interested parties will not be able to
comment meaningfully upon the agency's proposals. As a result, the
agency may operate with a one-sided or mistaken picture of the issues at
stake in a rule-making. In order to allow for useful criticism, it is espe-
dally important for the agency to identify and make available technical
studies and data that it has employed in reaching the decisions to propose
particular rules.268
In addition, the court discussed the APA's requirement for a concise
general statement of the basis and purpose of the rule, reminding the
agency of its procedural duty to spare a reviewing court the "task of
rummaging through the record to elicit a rationale of its own." 269
These functional interpretations of the APA view the entire process of
notice and comment rulemaking as a method of enhancing the effec-
tiveness of agency decisionmaking, providing the agency with
"[s]uggestions from informed sources [which] are especially valuable
when [an] agency must implement a complex and technical statute. 27 °
Other courts have justified expansive interpretations of the APA as
essential to the assurance of rational agency decisionmaking. 271 For
Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 n.4 (Ist Cir. 1979) (citing legislative history of APA on scope of notice in
rulemaking) with Connecticut Power & Light Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530-34 (D.C. Cir.) (dis-
cussing scope of rulemaking notice without any citation to legislative history of APA), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 79 (1982) and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(discussing the procedural requirements of informal rulemaking without reference to the legisla-
tive history of APA) and Environmental Defense Fund v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 659-61 (D.D.C.
1978) (discussing prohibitions on ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking without reference to
legislative history of APA).
266. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 301-03.
267. 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
268. Id at 530.
269. Id at 535 (citing United States ex rel Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773, 783 (2d Cir.
1972)).
270. Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Gorsuch, 682 F.2d 419, 426 (2d Cir. 1982).
271. See BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
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these courts, the procedural framework in which rulemaking occurs
provides the primary, if not exclusive, guarantee that the agency has
acted properly.272 Doubting the efficacy of any substantive judicial re-
view, these courts are
[w]iling to entrust the Agency with wide-ranging regulatory discretion,
and even, to a lesser extent, with an interpretive discretion vis-A-vis its
statutory mandate, so long as we are assured that its promulgation process
as a whole and in each of its major aspects provides a degree of public
awareness, understanding, and participation commensurate with the com-
plexity and intrusiveness of the resulting regulations.273
Under this reasoning, the substantive validity of any rule is primarily
assessed in terms of the rule's ability to clear procedural hurdles which
subject the rule to the careful scrutiny of an informed public.27 4 Sub-
stantive "hard look" review of agency rulemaking by courts is dis-
counted in favor of a "strict" procedural review geared to insure that
thepublic has had a meaningful opportunity to take a "hard look" at
the rule.275 It is small wonder that, in the eyes of these courts, the
rulemaking provisions of the APA must embody a considerable degree
of "openness, explanation, and participatory democracy." 276
Like the suggestions of Judges Wright and Scalia,2 7 7 these broad, in-
strumental interpretations of the APA's notice and comment rulemak-
ing procedures promise to correct some of the current procedural
inadequacies of informal rulemaking. Though one may perhaps take
issue with some of the assumptions which underlie these constructions
of the APA,27 8 congressional inertia and the practical realities of
rulemaking necessitate this more functional approach to rulemaking
procedures. An expansive interpretation of the notice and comment
rulemaking provisions is vital for the preservation of the procedural
U.S. 1096 (1980); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 659-61 (D.D.C. 1978).
272. See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1979); BASF Wyandotte
Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 641 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Environmental Defense Fund v. Blum, 458
F. Supp. 650, 659 (D.D.C. 1978).
273. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
274. See id See also authorities cited supra note 59.
275. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
276. Id
277. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 394-95; Wright, supra note 29, at 380-81.
278. See, e.g., Byse, supra note 88, at 1827.
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values which legitimize agency rulemaking.27 9
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INFORMAL
RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
It is not surprising that neither the lower courts nor the academic
community have found it possible to adhere to the formula for judicial
review of informal rulemaking procedures outlined in Vermont Yan-
kee. If the literal requirements of section 553 of the APA really do
mark the extent of the procedures which can be imposed upon
rulemakers by reviewing courts, modem rulemaking will face formida-
ble challenges to its very legitimacy as a regulatory tool. 280 When
viewed in light of the normative values which underlie informal
rulemaking, use of the bare-boned procedural format of section 553
will rarely prove adequate in a modem regulatory context. Thus, by
one method or another, courts and commentators alike have sought to
require or induce agencies to supplement the APA's informal rulemak-
ing procedures. Some have suggested that Vermont Yankee should be
ignored,28' and a number of courts seem to have done just that.282 This
is surely an unacceptable response to an issue of such importance to the
administrative process. There must be some attempt to accommodate
the concerns of Vermont Yankee with the need for more adequate
rulemaking procedures. As has been demonstrated, however, the
search for a comprehensive and consistent theory for judicial review of
agency rulemaking procedures continues. The various approaches of-
fered so far seem either incomplete, underdeveloped, or inadequate.
Until such a theory presents itself, judicial intrusion into the procedural
choices of rulemakers will continue to suffer legitimate criticism as
either disguised, ad hoc, or inappropriate judicial meddling.
To survive Vermont Yankee unscathed by such criticism, a theory of
procedural review must present a rationale for a required uniform
rulemaking procedure which will be flexible enough to meet the de-
mands of a melange of regulatory contexts, yet precise enough to offer
279. See infra text accompanying notes 284-396.
280. Seesu pra text accompanying notes 76-77. See also S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
6-9 (1981).
281. See Davis, supra note 7, at 17.
282. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 61:891
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/1
INFORMAL RULEMAKING
rulemakers some certainty that their efforts will not be constantly re-
manded for procedural error. In addition, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, any such theory of judicial review of rulemaking procedures
must find its origin at least in the spirit, if not the letter, of the APA. If,
as Vermont Yankee has decreed, the APA establishes firm boundaries
for the procedural review of rulemaking, then any theory of active judi-
cial supervision of rulemaking procedure must turn inward from those
boundaries and trace its roots to the statute, its legislative history, its
purposes, and its values.
This section suggests such a theory. It draws from the ideas, intima-
tions, and rationales of others, but represents an attempt to draw these
separate strands together into a balanced and comprehensive approach
to judicial review of informal rulemaking procedures. The theory rests
upon four premises. First, while strict allegiance to the literal com-
mands of the APA's procedural requirements of section 553 will, in
most situations, provide an administratively efficient framework for
rulemaking, it will jeopardize the fairness, effectiveness, and accounta-
bility of that process. Second, reliance on substantive judicial review,
no matter how intensive, cannot compensate for the normative defi-
ciencies which result from a literal approach to the APA's rulemaking
procedures. Third, except to the extent that certain procedures may be
required by law, rulemakers should have the discretion to employ those
rulemaking procedures which they feel are best suited to both the par-
ticular rulemaking context and the agency's available resources. Last,
reviewing courts have not only the responsibility to impose those
rulemaking procedures required by a normative interpretation of the
APA's rulemaking provisions, but also the authority to review the pro-
cedural judgments of agencies with respect to the need for additional
discretionary rulemaking procedures.
Judicial review of rulemaking procedures should afford deference to
the procedural expertise of rulemakers. It should, however, also seek to
preserve the integrity of agency rulemaking by insuring that both re-
quired and discretionary rulemaking procedures reflect the normative
values which should characterize all administrative rulemaking. The
following section begins with an outline of those procedures which
would be required by a normative interpretation of section 553 and
which consequently should be considered standard procedure in all in-
formal rulemaking situations. The section concludes with a suggested
framework for judicial review of the procedural discretion of
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
944 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
rulemakers.2 s3
A. Procedures Required by Law in all Informal Rulemaking
Proceedings
1. Notice
Section 553(b) of the APA requires that:
[gleneral notice of proposed rulemaking ... shall include
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking
proceeedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed;
and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved.284
Properly interpreted in light of the procedural values of informal
rulemaking, this provision of the APA would require a rulemaker to
publish a detailed notice of her proposed rulemaking, to provide for
continuous disclosure during the proceeding of all data or argument
relevant to the proposed rulemaking, and to establish a public docket
or file for each rulemaking proceeding.
a. The Content of the Rulemaking Notice
The notice of proposed rulemaking which is published in the Federal
Register should contain a clear and comprehensive statement of the
purpose of the rulemaking proceedings, that is, a statement of the issues
sought to be resolved and the agency's current objectives.285 The pub-
lished notice also should contain any draft of the specific rule which the
agency proposes to adopt; a summary of the factual data, research
methods, studies, and reports which the agency has already relied upon
or intends to rely upon during the proceeding; a statement outlining the
legal interpretations or policy considerations which the agency believes
are relevant to the rulemaking; and an explanation of how the agency
has arrived at its initial findings and proposals in light of its data, the
relevant law, and agency policy.286 If the agency has already consid-
283. See infra text accompanying notes 396-428.
284. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
285. See S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1981); see also Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
286. See S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-23 (1981); S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 117 (1981). See also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C.
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ered and rejected other proposals or other approaches to the issues, the
notice should so state and provide, at least by reference, some explana-
tion for the agency's conclusions." 7 Finally, the notice should specify
the statutory authority and procedures for the rulemaking,288 together
with information detailing how the public may inspect or copy any
documents and materials summarized or referred to in the notice.
While such a detailed notice requirement has been incorporated into
the rulemaking sections of recent regulatory statutes289 and many of the
proposed revisions to the APA, 29° a judicially imposed duty to provide
such notice need not be based upon legislative amendment to the APA.
Even after Vermont Yankee, a reviewing court legitimately can require
such procedures simply by interpreting the textual requirements of the
APA in a way which is sensitive to the purposes of notice and comment
rulemaking and the procedural values which should characterize such
rulemaking. 9 Courts should find that in most rulemaking contexts
such detailed notice is required if the proceeding is to be not only effi-
cient, but effective and fair as well. 292
While detailed notice of rulemaking can promote and enhance the
effectiveness of rulemaking in a number of ways,293 in at least one re-
spect such notice may be vital to the effectiveness of rulemaking. If the
Cir.i, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d
240 (2d Cir. 1982); Wright, Informal Rulemaking, supra note 154, at 63; Wright, supra note 29, at
380-81.
287. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Amoco Oil Co. v.
EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d
615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
288. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
289. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (1982).
290. See, e.g., S.1080, § 3, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2713-14 (daily ed. Mar. 24,
1982).
291. See Wright, supra note 29, at 380-8 1; Wright, Informal Rulemaking, supra note 154, at 63.
See also S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1981).
292. See S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 15, 21, 23 (1981); S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 120 (1981).
293. A requirement of detailed notice of informal rulemaking will provide an incentive to the
agency to conduct the preliminary, nonpublic stages of the rulemaking process in a careful and
disciplined fashion. A notice requirement which forces the agency to publicly disclose the reason-
ing which has led to its proposed rule will encourage comprehensive investigation, careful choice
and use of methodological techniques, and a clear and organized approach toward the regulatory
problem. It may be that much of the regulatory delay attributed to public rulemaking proceedings
and judicial review thereof is caused by agencies beginning the rulemaking process with only a
very tentative appreciation of the nature and scope of the issues involved. A detailed notice of
informal rulemaking requires the agency to demonstrate a rational and effective institutional ap-
proach to each rulemaking process.
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purpose of public rulemaking is to allow the public to inform and edu-
cate the rulemaker, the public should be made fully aware of the
agency's current thinking on the problem.294 An agency requests pub-
lic comment on a particular issue or rule in order to elicit information
confirming or criticizing the agency's proposed solution to the problem
or suggesting alternative approaches.295 Presumably, the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking invites a broad range of independent public analysis
in an effort to reach not just a rational solution to the regulatory prob-
lem, but the best solution to that problem. Public rulemaking thus as-
sumes that agency expertise is never infallible. It is entirely possible
that a proposed rule may be based upon incomplete or inaccurate data,
or that the agency's analysis of that data may be somehow flawed.
Moreover, the agency's factual or legal inferences may be questionable
and its reasoning faulty or short-sighted. Left uncorrected, such errors
would threaten not only to skew the agency's initial perception of the
issues, but also to color its evaluation of the public's comments on the
proposed rule. Under these circumstances the agency's rule certainly
cannot be expected to reflect the best solution, and may not even repre-
sent a rational solution to the problem. Effective rulemaking, in order
to minimize such risks, requires notice of rulemaking that clearly out-
lines the agency's objectives, its proposed rule, the factual and legal
basis for that rule, and the agency's reasons for rejecting alternative
proposals. Without such notice the agency deprives itself of the valua-
ble opportunity to have its initial efforts scrutinized by members of the
public with interest and expertise in the issues. Only with such detailed
notice can those affected by the rule be relied upon to point out flaws in
the agency's rejection of alternative approaches or in the factual or le-
gal foundation for the agency's actual proposal. The public cannot of-
fer informed or relevant comment on data or reasoning that is
undisclosed or only vaguely revealed. And any potential threat to reg-
294. See Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Gorsuch, 683 F.2d 648, 655-56 (2d Cir. 1982); Con-
necticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 79
(1982); Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC,
412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
295. See supra note 294; Wright, Informal Rulemaking, supra note 154, at 63; Wright, msra
note 27, at 380-81. See also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252
(2d Cir. 1977); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 660 (1st Cir. 1974); Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974);
Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 170-71 (6th Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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ulatory efficiency posed by such detailed notice seems a reasonable
price to pay for the very real benefits to be gained from more informed
public comment.2 9 6
The practical relationship between rulemaking notices and the pub-
lic's statutory right to comment on proposed agency rules would seem
to require this detailed notice in order to insure procedural fairness in
notice and comment rulemaking. The statutory right to comment guar-
antees the public an opportunity to participate in the formulation of
rules, an opportunity to inform and influence the rulemaking process.
Without adequate notice of what the agency proposes to do, that op-
portunity is jeopardized.2 97 A fair notice of proposed rulemaking seeks
to effectuate and protect the opportunity for public comment and ac-
complishes that task only when it fully and accurately informs inter-
ested persons of the purpose, substance, and basis for the proposed
agency rule. A notice which forces interested persons to reconstruct or
guess at the factual or legal basis for an agency's proposal imposes un-
fair burdens on the interested public. There is simply no assurance that
those affected by the rule will have the time, money, or expertise to
ferret out vague or undisclosed assumptions, inferences, or findings
that may underlie an agency's proposal. Without detailed notice, the
ability to frame meaningful comment or criticism concerning the basic
premises of the agency's rule is unnecessarily and unfairly
constrained.298
296. Such detailed notice may open the door to public attacks on the agency's factual or legal
analysis merely to delay regulatory action. But an agency need not consider or respond to irrele-
vant, insignificant or frivolous attacks. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394
(D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[C]omments must be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement of
materiality before any lack of agency response or consideration becomes of concern."), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). There will undoubtedly be instances, however, where public groups
will raise at least colorable objections to the agency's proposals in order to force a time consuming,
though ultimately successful, agency defense of its proposal. Where the risk of such a delay would
unduly hamper the agency's ability to carry out its duties or seriously impede emergency agency
action, the APA allows the agency to forego all public procedure. Section 553(b)(B) states that the
agency need not provide notice of or begin a public rulemaking proceeding "when the agency for
good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the
rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to the public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982). See also National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v.
Kennedy, 572 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1978). Without "good cause," however, the agency will have to
respond to such objections and endure what it may feel are unnecessary delays.
297. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied 103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977).
298. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
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Procedural fairness also requires that an agency's notice identify any
significant alternative proposals which the agency may have already
considered and explain why the agency may have rejected those pro-
posals. 299 Not only would this assist the public in understanding the
agency's actual proposal, but it would also reduce the risk that valuable
resources would be expended suggesting alternatives already found un-
acceptable by the agency. It might also provide those who favor such
alternatives with their only opportunity to rebut the agency's rejection
of that alternative.
Judicial interpretation of section 553 of the APA that requires com-
prehensive and detailed notices of proposed rulemaking does not dis-
tort the intent of the APA's drafters. The legislative history of the APA
clearly reflects congressional recognition that an agency's published no-
tice is vital to any rulemaking proceeding. 3° Without a clear and defi-
nite indication of the nature and scope of the rulemaking, the public's
participation in the rulemaking is "likely to be diffused and of little real
value either to the participating parties or to the agency. '301 Congress
intended rulemakers to "announce with the greatest possible definite-
ness the matters to be discussed in the rule making proceedings. ' 30 2 All
that is proposed here is that rulemakers provide the public with as
much information as possible about what it is the agency proposes to
do, why the agency has made such a proposal, and how that proposal
best serves to accomplish the agency's stated objective.
b. The Duty of Continuous Disclosure
An agency's duty to inform those affected by its rulemaking activities
does not end with the publication of a detailed notice of proposed
rulemaking. Rather, the APA's notice requirement can and should be
interpreted to impose upon the agency the duty to provide continuous
103 S. Ct. 79 (1982). As Judge Mikva aptly stated: "To allow an agency to play hunt the peanut
with technical information, hiding or disguising the information that it employs, is to condone a
practice in which the agency treats what should be a genuine interchange as mere bureaucratic
sport." Id
299. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 437-39 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Amoco Oil Co.
v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
300. FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 108; ATT'y GEN. MAN., supra note 28 at 29-31; LEO.
HIST., supra note 28, at 18, 200, 258.
301. LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 18 (citing FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 108).
302. Id
[Vol. 61:891
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/1
INFORMAL RULEMAKING
disclosure during the proceeding of all information pertinent to that
proceeding. Thus, an agency's failure to notify the public when it con-
templates substantial and significant alterations to its original proposal
may constitute a violation of the APA's notice provisions."' While
both the statute and its legislative history are silent about any duty to
recycle a rulemaking proceeding under such circumstances, it is un-
likely that even the most ardent foes of procedural review in rulemak-
ing would find fault with judicial remands of this sort. When the
agency finds that its final rule is substantially different from its initial
proposal and that these changes have not been adequately foreshad-
owed in a previous public notice,"° or during the rulemaking proceed-
ing itself," 5 the agency cannot validly promulgate the rule without
further notice and comment. To do so would deprive the public of its
statutory right to pre-promulgation notice and comment on the final
rule,306 and consequently, its right to a fair and effective rulemaking
process.
A normative interpretation of the APA would also require that agen-
cies provide continuous disclosure of all data or argument received by
the agency during the rulemaking proceeding, together with any rele-
vant information which the agency obtains either outside the public
rulemaking proceeding or after its public procedures have concluded.
New data generated within the agency after its notice of proposed
rulemaking should also be revealed. 07 While ex parte communica-
tions received during rulemaking need not be forbidden under a nor-
mative interpretation of the notice provision of the APA, they should
be immediately disclosed to the public along with a summary of their
contents.3 °8
303. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). See generally
Rochvarg, supra note 30, at 34 n.16.
304. See Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1018-21 (3d Cir. 1972); Rochvarg,supra
note 30, at 10-11.
305. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 (1st Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1096 (1980).
306. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Rochvarg, supra note 30, at 3; Note, supra note 30, at 229.
307. See Pedersen, supra note II, at 79; Wright, supra note 29, at 381; Wright, Informal
Rulemaking, supra note 154, at 63. See also Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,
394 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
308. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977); Wright, Musings on Administratiye Law, 33 AD. L. REv. 177, 180-82 (1981).
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The agency need not publish data or argument obtained after its no-
tice of proposed rulemaking but should take care that the public is
made aware of and has access to this information. The same analysis
which concluded that procedural fairness and effectiveness require the
detailed disclosure of pre-notice agency data would also require the
agency to make any new, self-generated data available for public scru-
tiny. And if, as will be discussed later, a fair and effective rulemaking
process will always provide interested persons with some opportunity
to respond to the data, views, or arguments submitted by others,30 9 the
public should also be given "notice" of all public comment received
after the initial notice of proposed rulemaking. One cannot respond to
materials of which one is unaware.
c. The Problem of Ex Parte Contacts
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the duty of continuous disclosure
concerns ex parte contacts. The case law and academic commentary on
this subject reflect deep disagreement over the necessity and propriety
of ex parte contacts in notice and comment rulemaking. Some authori-
ties argue that ex parte contacts compromise the fairness and accounta-
bility of agency rulemaking.310 Others assert that a total ban on ex
parte contacts would seriously undermine the effectiveness of informal
rulemaking.31' This latter group concludes that the realities of the reg-
ulatory arena firmly establish the need for continuous contact between
the agency and outsiders, making a ban on such contact impractical
and unwise.312
A judicial interpretation of section 553 that imposes a duty upon
rulemakers to disclose all ex parte communications in at least summary
309. See infra text accompanying notes 327-37.
310. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); Wright, supra note 308, at 181.
311. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 9, § 6:19, at 537; Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal"
Coal and the Clean Air4ct, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1563-64 (1980); Carberry, Ex Parte Communication
in Off-the-RecordAdministrative Proceedings: 4 Proposed Limitation of Judicial Innovation, 1980
DuKE LJ. 65; Nathanson, Report on Ex Parte Communications, supra note 110, at 397-400. See
also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
312. [Tlhe importance to effective regulation of continuing contact with a regulated in-
dustry, other affected groups, and the public cannot be underestimated. Informal con-
tacts may enable the agency to win needed support for its program, reduce future
enforcement requirements by helping those regulated to anticipate and shape their plans
for the future, and spur the provision of information which the agency needs.
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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form could effectuate a reasonable accommodation between those who
favor and those who oppose a ban on ex parte contacts. While it is by
no means clear that informal communication during or after the public
comment period is as indispensible to effective rulemaking as its propo-
nents claim,313 it does seem inappropriate to prevent all such communi-
cation. When, for example, the agency needs clarification or further
explanation of data or argument submitted during the public comment
period, it should be free to seek that information. While ex parte con-
tacts should not be allowed to supplant the public comment procedures
of the APA, they may serve as useful supplements to those procedures
and should not be prohibited.
At the same time, ex parte contacts threaten the integrity of the
rulemaking process. If informal rulemaking is to be fair, it must be an
open and public process with equal access to the decisionmaker. Unre-
vealed ex parte contacts during informal rulemaking constitute an ob-
vious and serious violation of this norm. Once the decisionmaking
process is taken behind doors which are open only to those with some
special key, the process becomes tainted. The notion that some partici-
pants in a decisionmaking process enjoy special opportunities to inform
or influence that process simply offends democratic sensibilities.
Immediate disclosure of the occurrence and content of such contacts
cannot completely remove the blemish of unfairness which ex parte
contacts inevitably cause. Immediate disclosure may, however, allow
the agency to allay some of the suspicions which accompany any hint
of secrecy or special privilege and to preserve some measure of the
openness and even-handedness compromised by ex parte contacts.
Coupled with a requirement that the agency docket at least a summary
of the contents of any such contacts and allow all participants an op-
portunity to respond to the substance of the ex parte communications,
313. Not even the most vociferous critics of ex parte contacts in rulemaking have suggested a
total ban on the exchange of technical information or policy views between agency personnel and
outsiders. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 308, at 180. Objections arise only when such exchanges
take place in private. Id In addition, there may be alternative ways of achieving the benefits
often attributed to ex parte communications. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-02 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). The APA's provisions allowing the public to petition for reconsideration of a promul-
gated rule would enable an interested party to bring newly obtained information, unavailable
during the rulemaking, to the attention of the rulemaker without undue delay or threat to the
efficiency or effectiveness of the rulemaking process. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982). Both statutory and
discretionary delays on the effective date of a final rule should allow the regulated community
sufficient time to adjust to a new rule before enforcement of the rule. Id § 553(d).
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immediate disclosure should salvage the fairness of a rulemaking
proceeding.
This disclosure procedure would also preserve other normative
rulemaking requirements which are jeopardized by ex parte communi-
cations. To the extent that unrevealed ex parte contacts deprive the
agency of critical analysis of the substance of those contacts by other
interested participants, the effectiveness of the rulemaking proceeding
will suffer. Public disclosure of and comment on ex parte communica-
tions will significantly reduce the risk that the agency may rely upon
incomplete or inaccurate data and arguments which are submitted ex
parte. And, as Judge Wright has noted,3"4 timely disclosure and public
analysis of the contents of ex parte contacts preserves agency accounta-
bility by providing reviewing courts not only with the full record of the
agency's decisionmaking process but also with further assurance of the
fairness and rationality of the agency's decision.
d Public Rulemaking Dockets
Finally, the concept of adequate notice in rulemaking should require
the agency to create a public fie or docket for each rulemaking pro-
ceeding. This docket should contain all of the relevant information in
an organized and indexed format." 5 This file would include the full
text of materials summarized or referenced in the agency's published
rulemaking notice, further relevant information generated from within
the agency after its notice of rulemaking, and all information submitted
to the agency by the public at any time prior to the promulgation of the
final rule.311 While elsewhere it will be argued that this docketing re-
quirement is necessary in order to provide reviewing courts with a rec-
ord of the rulemaking process, 317 in this context the public docket or
file serves to effectuate the public's right to fair notice of all information
pertinent to the rulemaking proceeding. Because the public's right to
participate in rulemaking is inevitably and entirely dependent upon the
adequacy of the agency notice, 318 some means must be found to pro-
vide this notice in an effective fashion.
314. See, etg., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54-55 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Wright, supra note 308, at 180.
315. See Pedersen, supra note 11, at 79-82.
316. See id at 79.
317. See infra text accompanying notes 376-95.
318. See cases cited supra note 297.
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Common sense and due regard for the efficiency of the rulemaking
process must guide the choice of a means to implement the right to
notice. Establishing a central, public repository containing all of the
documents and materials submitted to or considered by the rulemaker
will provide interested persons with full and accurate notice of infor-
mation which could not reasonably be published or provided to each
participant by the agency. A public file assures the public of timely and
equal notice of ongoing developments in the rulemaking proceeding
and convenient access to all information considered by the rulemaker.
This docket should also provide an efficient method for the exchange of
information, thereby eliminating much of the expensive and time-con-
suming discovery practices which frequently characterize informal
rulemaking proceedings.319 Use of a central docket will relieve the
agency of the enormous problems associated with providing continu-
ous, adequate notice to all parties by creating a mechanical, self-execut-
ing notice process. In a sense, the burden of insuring adequate notice
will be shifted from the agency to the rulemaking participants them-
selves, who will now have to monitor the docket index in order to keep
abreast of the progress of events. While this burden may be difficult for
some participants,320 it seems justified by the benefits associated with
this expanded notice procedure and the need for administrative
efficiency.
2. The Opportunity to Participate
Section 553(c) of the APA requires that:
the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation .... When rules are
required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this
subsection.32l
This section of the APA has always provoked the most controversy in
the case law and commentary on informal rulemaking. The vagueness
of the section's language has always presented a formidable challenge
to judicial attempts to define the specific scope of the procedural rights
it grants. Although the Constitution does not provide the public with
319. See Pedersen, supra note 11, at 83-88.
320. See id at 79 n.150.
321. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
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any right to be heard by rulemakers,322 Congress clearly has decided
that the public must be given some opportunity to participate in infor-
mal rulemaking. Unfortunately, Congress has not been very clear as to
the nature of this right to participate.
Analysis of the statute itself leads to the conclusion that absent some
explicit statutory proviso, the public need not be afforded a trial-like
hearing on the merits of substantive regulations. The APA establishes
a separate formal rulemaking procedure which calls for a trial-like for-
mat only in situations designated by Congress.323 Congress apparently
has decided that judicial decisionmaking processes are rarely suitable
for the resolution of the types of issues that most frequently confront
rulemakers324 and, accordingly, has reserved for itself and its agents the
discretion to decide when such formal processes will be utilized in
rulemaking. The Supreme Court has acceded to that congressional de-
cision and has limited mandatory trial-like rulemaking procedures to
the rarest of circumstances.325
Beyond this restriction on the use of full-blown trials in rulemaking,
the only other limitations on public participation found in the text or
legislative history of section 553 deal with the mode of participation.
The statute gives agencies authority to limit the public to the submis-
sion of written data, views, or arguments. Oral presentations of such
information are to be allowed only at the discretion of the agency. The
legislative history of section 553 provides that the agency may, in its
discretion, consult with those who are affected by the rule, holding con-
ferences and even public hearings if it feels that such procedures will be
helpful or useful to the agency or public. 326 But again, while various
modes of public participation are suggested, no clear picture of the na-
ture of that participation emerges. Is public participation in informal
rulemaking, whatever its format, limited to comment upon the agency's
proposed rule? Or should rulemaking participants be allowed to com-
ment on the comments of other participants? Is public participation
designed only to provide further information supporting or criticizing
the agency's initial efforts at rulemaking, perhaps suggesting, in addi-
322. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
323. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982), construed in United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224
(1973).
324. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 109-11. See also authorities cited supra note 45.
325. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
326. See LEG. HisT., supra note 28, at 20, 200-01, 259; FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 103-
11; ATV'Y GEN. MAN., supra note 28, at 29, 31.
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tion, alternative approaches to the regulatory problem at hand? Or
should the participation of an interested and expert public be used also
as a tool for the testing of all accumulated data and suggested alterna-
tives? Is the opportunity to participate in rulemaking merely limited to
a dialogue between the agency and the affected public? Or should in-
formal rulemaking procedures be designed to accommodate the fact
that rulemakers most often face a public of diverse and usually compet-
ing interests which seldom speaks with one voice?
The purported purpose of public participation in informal rulemak-
ing is to educate the agency and to protect the public from unwise and
uninformed agency action.327 If those goals are to be accomplished in
an efficient, effective, and fair manner, the APA should be interpreted
to guarantee a right to participate in the accumulation and evaluation
of information relevant to the proposed agency rule and an impartial
forum in which to exercise those rights. Such an interpretation will
require that, at a minimum, the public be allowed to submit written
comments, not only on the agency's proposed rule, but also on the writ-
ten comments submitted by all participants in the rulemaking process.
In other words, the opportunity to participate should be read to in-
clude, as a procedural minimum, some opportunity to rebut or respond
to the data, views, and arguments of others. In addition, these par-
ticipatory rights should be protected by some realistic mechanism
which preserves the impartiality of the rulemaking process and elimi-
nates, or at least reduces, the risk of bias in regulatory decisionmaking.
a. The Right to Submit Rebuttal Comments
The suggestion of rebuttal rights in informal rulemaking is bound to
conjure up notions of adjudicatory procedures in the minds of some, so
perhaps it would be prudent to allay such fears at the outset. The
agency itself should have the freedom to decide upon the most appro-
priate structure and format for the public's right to respond. Rebuttal
rights need not be implemented by means of a trial-like hearing, or
even a disputed-issues hearing with limited cross-examination or ap-
pellate-type oral argument. Such procedures have limited utility in the
rulemaking context and are frequently inefficient.32 ' All that would be
327. See LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 20; FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 103-11; ATrry
GEN. MAN., supra note 28, at 31. See also Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 470
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
328. See authorities cited upra note 44.
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necessary, as a procedural minimum, would be the assurance of appro-
priate notice and an adequate opportunity to file at least written com-
ments responding to any data or arguments submitted by others during
a designated initial comment period. This minimum procedural re-
quirement would not threaten the procedural efficiency of a rulemak-
ing proceeding and is essential to the effectiveness and fairness of
informal rulemaking.
An effective rulemaking procedure is designed to enhance the
agency's opportunity to formulate not only a rational rule, but a rule
which best implements Congress' regulatory policy.3 29 Given the im-
portance Congress has attached to public participation in rulemak-
ing,330 agencies should fully involve the public not only in the initial
data-accumulation stage of rulemaking but also in the equally impor-
tant evaluative stages of the rulemaking process. If the public's ability
to provide supplementary or critical information regarding an agency's
initial regulatory suggestions is valued, should not rulemakers also
value the public's expertise in evaluating the information, including
public comment, which the agency is required to consider in the formu-
lation of regulatory policy? While the evaluative capabilities of agency
personnel are often significant and deserving of respect, nothing in the
APA, its legislative history, or administrative practice suggests that
these abilities are either singularly unique or infallible. An interpreta-
tion of the public's right to participate in informal rulemaking which
includes the right to analyze and respond in writing to initial public
comment provides a simple and efficient vehicle for the use of public
expertise in the evaluation of rulemaking data.
A right to submit rebuttal comments is certain to enhance the sub-
stantive effectiveness of the process while preserving the procedural ef-
ficiency so highly prized in rulemaking.33' If public participation
includes the right both to comment and respond, it will not only pro-
vide the agency with critical analysis of preliminary staff work but may
also reduce the risk of agency reliance on inaccurate, incomplete, or
inappropriate materials which may have been submitted by other par-
ticipants. A second round of responsive comment will allow the agency
to discover inadequacies in or resolve challenges to rulemaking data
during the rulemaking proceeding itself, rather than in later actions for
329. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
330. See LEG. HIsT., supra note 28, at 20, 257.
331. See S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 25-26 (1981).
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administrative amendment or judicial review of the rule. Failure to
provide the interested public with some rebuttal opportunity will insu-
late the rulemaker from increasingly indispensable public assistance in
the decisionmaking process and will invite regulatory delay.
The inclusion of a structured rebuttal procedure may also be neces-
sary to insure that the rulemaking process is fair. An informal
rulemaking process which does not allow the public to point out errors,
misstatements, or inconsistencies in the data that will be considered by
the agency and that may form the basis for significant developments or
changes in regulatory policy is unlikely to be perceived as an open,
accessible, or acceptable decisionmaking process. When the agency
fails to provide a separate structured procedure for rebuttal comment,
some participants may gain procedural advantages which unfairly en-
hance their ability to influence the rulemaking process. By allowing
only one round of comment, the agency puts a premium on the delayed
submission of materials. Late submission allows some participants to
examine the earlier submissions of others, to shape their comments as
both expository and rebutting, and to insulate their own arguments
from repudiation by others. A second responsive comment period
eliminates these special advantages arid insures all participants an
equal opportunity to inform the agency's ultimate decision.332
Finally, given the changes in the timing and nature of judicial review
of informal rulemaking, it is imperative that participants in notice and
comment rulemaking be given some opportunity to challenge all data
upon which an agency's rule is based. Until relatively recently, most
judicial review of informally promulgated rules took place during en-
forcement actions brought in the federal district courts.333 When seek-
ing to enjoin or defend against such an action, those adversely affected
by an agency's rule were routinely given the opportunity to discover
and challenge the complete factual and legal basis for the rule, includ-
ing any public comment which may have been relied upon by the
agency in promulgating the rule.334 Now, however, the rationality of
agency rulemaking is primarily tested during pre-enforcement review
332. See id
333. Auerbach, supra note 106, at 24-25 (citing LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 214, 279-80);
Nathanson, Probing the Mind, supra note 110, at 755.
334. See Nathanson, supra note 7, at 189-91 & n.34.
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actions in the federal courts of appeal.335 These courts base their lim-
ited review of agency rulemaking exclusively on the record of the
agency's informal rulemaking proceeding.336 Thus, if an adverse party
is to be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the validity of a
rule by attacking its factual or legal basis, in fairness that opportunity
should be afforded during the informal rulemaking proceeding itself,
where rebuttal argument can be made part of the record and thus prop-
erly available for later judicial review. Professors Auerbach and Na-
thanson contend that, given these changes in the judicial review of
informal rules, the right to submit rebuttal comments during notice and
comment rulemaking may well be required to insure that the proceed-
ing meets constitutional tests for fairness. 337 It is suggested here that,
whatever the merits of this constitutional argument, the right to submit
rebuttal comments should be required as a matter of statutory right in
order to effectuate the congressional intent that informal rulemaking
proceedings be fair.
b. The Problem of Bias in Rulemaking
While there is general agreement among courts and commentators
on the need to insure that notice and comment rulemaking is free from
the taint of decisional bias,33 8 only minimum safeguards currently exist.
Federal law prohibits rulemakers from participating in proceedings in
which they have a substantial personal interest. In addition, all agen-
cies have regulations governing a rulemaker's participation in proceed-
ings in which she has a personal interest. 339 More difficult problems
arise, however, when the question of bias in rulemaking goes beyond
conflicts of interest.
335. See Auerbach, supra note 106, at 26-28. See also Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Gover-
nors, 551 F.2d 1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
336. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2341-2351 (1982). See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See also Auerbach, supra note 106, at
26-38.
337. See Auerbach, supra note 106, at 40; Nathanson, Probing the Mind, supra note 110, at
757-58.
338. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1172-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1174 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); Gellhorn & Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process".-
An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201 (1981); Strauss, Disqualifications of Decisional
Officials in Rulemaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (1980).
339. See Strauss, supra note 338, at 1000-09.
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Most authorities can agree that a rulemaker's prejudgment on sub-
stantive issues critical to the rulemaking may serve as the basis for
questioning her participation in the proceeding or the validity of the
final rule.3 40 Beyond this general rule, however, consensus deteriorates.
The case law and commentary reflect very different views on whether
prejudgment in rulemaking is forbidden as a matter of constitutional
due process or statutory law,34' whether the prohibition extends to is-
sues of law and policy, as well as specific factual issues, 342 and what
level of prejudgment must be demonstrated before a rulemaker's par-
ticipation in any particular proceeding becomes questionable.343
It seems unnecessary, and probably unavailing,344 to resort to consti-
tutional argument in order to guarantee an unbiased notice and com-
ment rulemaking process. On its face, the text of section 553 does not
require an impartial decisionmaking process, nor does it provide either
a substantive standard by which to measure a rulemaker's alleged bias
or any procedure for the disqualification of a biased rulemaker. 345 But
here again the limitations of a literal approach to questions of proce-
dure in rulemaking become obvious. The very structure of the APA's
informal rulemaking process reveals a congressional intent to have
most rulemaking decisions made only after the public has had an op-
portunity to inform and influence that decision. Substantial prejudg-
ment by a rulemaker before the receipt of public comment would
violate this structural precept. Whether one focuses on the APA's guar-
340. See authorities cited supra note 338.
341. Compare Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1165-74 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (suggesting that recusal of a biased rulemaker may be required by due process), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 921 (1980) and Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 338, at 222 (same) with Association of
Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1185-88 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that recusal is required as a matter of statutory law, not constitutional law), cert. de-
nied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980) and Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 338, at 225-29 (same) and Strauss,
supra note 338, at 1032-35 (same). See also infra text accompanying notes 345-47.
342. Compare Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (rejecting "bias" on policy issues as a basis for the recusal of a rulemaker), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 921 (1980) with id at 1185-92 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (suggesting that bias on "legislative
facts" may require the recusal of a rulemaker).
343. Compare Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1196-98 (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting) (requiring a showing of substantial bias by a preponderance of evidence) with id at
1170 (requiring a clear and convincing showing that the rulemaker has an unalterably closed
mind).
344. See Strauss, supra note 338, at 1032-35.
345. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). See also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1179 n.151
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
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antee to the public of an "opportunity to participate" in the rulemaking
process346 or its assurance that a rulemaker will promulgate a rule only
"[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter presented," 347 the result is
the same-the APA sets implicit limitations on the ability of a
rulemaker to formulate final judgments on issues prior to the receipt of
public input.
In addition, any interpretation of the APA's rulemaking provisions
which seeks to preserve the fairness and effectiveness of that process
certainly would require the recusal of a rulemaker, or the invalidation
of any rule promulgated by a decisionmaker, whose words or conduct
evidenced a substantial prejudgment of significant factual or policy is-
sues in any proceeding. Whatever else it may compel, the fairness
which Congress demanded of rulemakers surely requires that their de-
cisions be made openly and only after they have given good faith con-
sideration to all data and competing arguments. The integrity of
informal rulemaking stems in large part from the public's confidence
that rulemaking decisions can be influenced by public participation
and that an opportunity to inform the rulemaker's decision will always
be made available. A rulemaker who fails to consider publicly submit-
ted data and reaches a decision entirely on the basis of some private
predisposition turns notice and comment rulemaking into a sham. The
public's participation becomes a meaningless and futile exercise which
succeeds only in making the biased rulemaker's efforts at post-hoc ra-
tionalization a bit more difficult. By allowing for public participation
in notice and comment rulemaking, Congress sought to protect private
interests from precipitous agency action.348 The public cannot be fairly
protected when the outcome is preordained by some bias on the part of
the decisionmaker.349
A biased rulemaker also impedes the effectiveness of notice and com-
ment rulemaking. Congress' call for public participation in the infor-
346. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
347. Id
348. See LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 20, 201, 259; FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 103;
ATY' GEN. MAN., supra note 28, at 31.
349. See Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 338, at 217. When notice and comment rulemak-
ing procedures are properly interpreted to include some right of rebuttal, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 327-37, that is, when the agency approaches rulemaking with the realistic assumption
that the public interest in any regulatory issue is rarely, if ever, uniform and monolithic, the need
for openness and objectivity in rulemaking becomes even more pronounced and important to the
fairness of rulemaking.
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mal rulemaking process presupposes that agencies often lack the
expertise needed to arrive at the most appropriate implementation of
regulatory policy. Public participation was intended to supplement the
rulemaking process with informed public opinion and analysis. The
APA assumes that, beyond a few carefully delineated situations,35 ° ef-
fective substantive rulemaking requires public participation. Regula-
tory decisions will, it is presumed, more effectively reflect congressional
policy when they are made after a period of public participation and
not before. A rulemaker whose decision has been informed only by her
own factual, legal, or political perceptions violates this congressional
judgment. Thus, a rulemaker who fails to give good faith considera-
tion to all relevant public comment, or who evaluates public comment
according to the source or philosophical orientation of that comment
rather than its content, undermines the effectiveness of rulemaking and
violates the APA's rulemaking procedures. Similarly, a rulemaker
whose words or conduct present a strong predisposition with respect to
the factual or policy issues involved in an upcoming proceeding jeopar-
dizes the effectiveness of that proceeding by inhibiting or discouraging
public participation.
But a normative interpretation of the APA which would require im-
partiality must also contend with the realities of the regulatory process.
Any standard of impartiality, and even the procedure for disqualifica-
tion, must recognize the unique characteristics of the rulemaking pro-
cess. The decisionmaking process in rulemaking cannot be equated
with legislative or judicial models. The standards and procedures used
in those contexts to resolve questions of bias cannot be imported
wholesale into the context of rulemaking. 35' The political nature of the
regulatory arena, the institutional character of most rulemaking deci-
sions, and the type of issues that must be resolved by rulemakers call
for an approach to decisional bias which may be more forgiving than
that employed in judicial settings and more stringent than that found in
legislative decisionmaking.35 2
350. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a), (b)(A)-(B) (1982). See generall, LEG. HIsT., supra note 28, at 18, 200,
258.
351. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,400-01 & n.503, 405-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Associ-
ation of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1165, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert denied, 447
U.S. 921 (1980).
352. For an excellent discussion of the restraints on legislators and judges and why standards
of bias in those contexts may not be appropriate in an administrative rulemaking setting, see
Strauss, supra note 338, at 997-1048.
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The Supreme Court has long held that the integrity of the adminis-
trative process requires that administrative officials be presumed to be
objective and "capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the
basis of its own circumstances." '353 Of course, rulemakers will always
entertain and exhibit some subjective predispositions toward issues
which they will encounter during rulemaking proceedings. When Con-
gress delegates authority to an agency head or when the President ap-
points an officer to an agency, it must be assumed that the official will
form some ideas with respect to the appropriate implementation of her
authority. The very process of modem rulemaking contemplates that
agencies will come forward with regulatory initiatives which reflect
particular policy orientations. These initiatives are then subjected to
public scrutiny and comment which may present a different policy ori-
entation. A rulemaking proceeding is a crucible in which opposing
viewpoints are exposed and argued in an effort to inform and persuade
the ultimate decisionmaker. But there must be some catalyst for this
policy discussion and that catalyst is the regulatory proposal of the
agency, a proposal which must, of necessity, reflect at least an initial
position as to the appropriate solution to the regulatory problem at
hand. For these reasons, a standard for bias in rulemaking should not
chill a rulemaker's legitimate attempt to espouse or explain policy ini-
tiatives in public forums outside the rulemaking process. 35 4
What seems required by a normative interpretation of the APA is a
procedure which protects the public from rulemakers whose philosoph-
ical bias or policy orientation inhibits public participation in rulemak-
mng or prevents consideration of contrasting views in a fair and even-
handed fashion. What is needed is a standard for disqualifying bias
which assures the public that a rulemaker who holds strong views on
certain issues is nonetheless open to persuasion. As the case law dem-
onstrates, the problems inherent in devising an exact standard for bias
which is both enforceable and justifiable are many3 55 and cannot be
dealt with in depth in this Article. It is sufficient here to note that the
353. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976)
(quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)).
354. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
355. See id; see also United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cerl,
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1042 (1980). See generally Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 338, at 215-37; Strauss, supra
note 338, at 1027-48.
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normative values inherent in rulemaking require courts to meet and
address such issues when evaluating the adequacy of an agency's notice
and comment rulemaking procedures.
3. The Statement of the Basis and Purpose ofAgency Rules
Section 553(c) states that "[aifter consideration of the relevant matter
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose." '356 This section requires
rulemakers to explain their decisions, providing the public and review-
ing courts with information about the scope, objectives, and justifica-
tions for agency rules.357 It was thought this information would be
helpful in allowing the public to conform its conduct to new regulatory
standards and would assist the courts in interpreting and reviewing
agency regulations.358 Over the years, the courts have given an expan-
sive reading to this language and have required rulemakers to give
rather detailed explanations, but this judicial gloss seems at odds with
the statute's demand for only a "concise" and "general" statement of a
rule's basis and purpose.359
These broad judicial constructions of section 553 are justified. An
interpretation of the APA which focuses on the function of the basis
and purpose statement and the normative values which must inform
informal rulemaking would require an agency to compile a complete
and organized record of its rulemaking process. This rulemaking rec-
ord should include the notice of proposed agency rulemaking, all of the
materials included in the agency's rulemaking docket,36° the text of the
agency's final rule, and the agency's statement of the basis and purpose
of that rule.36 1 This final explanatory statement must include an identi-
356. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
357. See LEG. HimS., supra note 28, at 20, 201, 259; ATr'Y GEN. MAN., supra note 28, at 32,
128.
358. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); A-r'v GEN. MAN., supra note 28, at 32.
359. See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 79 (1982); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024 n.11 (D.C. Cir.
1978); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977); Automo-
tive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
360. See supra text accompanying notes 315-21.
361. See Pedersen, supra note 11, at 78-82; Wright, supra note 29, at 395. See the discussion of
congressional endorsement of such a record in the Clean Air Act in Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298, 392-95 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also S.1080, § 3(0, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC.
S2713-21 (daily ed. March 24, 1982).
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fication of the factual and legal issues addressed in the proceeding. It
should also contain a summary of any factual findings made and relied
upon by the rulemaker and an explanation of the rulemaker's fact-find-
ing process which points to the material in the rulemaking record
which forms the basis for those findings. The agency should identify
the relevant legal criteria or policy considerations and provide a de-
tailed exposition of how the agency arrived at its final rule given these
criteria and its factual findings. Finally, the agency should indicate its
reasons for rejecting significant objections to the rule raised by the pub-
lic's comments. The preparation of this record should be considered
mandatory in all notice and comment rulemaking and should consti-
tute the exclusive basis for judicial review of such rulemaking.
These rather elaborate record-making and explanation requirements,
though seemingly in excess of the statute's actual textual demands,
nonetheless find support in the APA's legislative history. When one
examines the legislative history it comes as no surprise that reviewing
courts, including perhaps the Supreme Court,362 have found that the
statute's description of an informal rulemaker's explanatory duties is
considerably misleading.363 Both the House and Senate explicitly indi-
cated that a rulemaker should provide the public with a statement of
basis and purpose which would be not only "fully explanatory of the
complete factual and legal basis"3 4 for any rule as well as "the real
object or objects sought" to be accomplished by the rulemaker, 365 but
also would indicate the relationship between the agency's rule and the
data presented by the public during the rulemaking proceeding.366
There probably are instances of rulemaking when such an explanation
can be framed in a concise and general fashion. But to suggest, as the
Attorney General did after the APA was passed, that Congress did not
intend the agency's explanation to include the "findings of fact ...
conclusions of law. . . or. . .the considerations upon which the rules
were issued '367 seems contrary to every congressional comment on the
362. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 394-95 (noting the Vermont Yankee Court's failure to even
address the fact that the lower court had asked the agency to prepare a statement of basis and
purpose far more detailed and comprehensive than required by the text of the APA).
363. See, e.g., Action on Smoking & Health v. CAB, 699 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024 n.1 I (D.C. Cir. 1978).
364. LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 20. See also id at 201, 259.
365. Id at 20.
366. Id at 201, 259.
367. ATf'" GEN. MAN., supra note 28, at 32.
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matter.
The legislative history of the APA, though somewhat sparse on this
issue, also supports the contention that agencies must compile a record
of their informal rulemaking processes. It is clear from that history
that Congress did not intend that informal rules would be made or re-
viewed solely on the basis of evidence or argument introduced and re-
corded at some trial-type rulemaking hearing.36 8 No hearings, let alone
trial-type hearings, were required in informal rulemaking situations.369
It is also clear that informal rulemakers would not be barred from rely-
ing upon data or argument gathered from sources other than publicly
submitted rulemaking comments.370 But neither of these observations
is particularly relevant to the question of whether an agency engaged in
informal rulemaking must compile a record of all the data it has con-
sidered during the rulemaking process, regardless of the source of that
data or the procedural format of the proceeding. In fact, a requirement
that an agency reach and justify its decision solely on the basis of a
comprehensive rulemaking record seems quite consistent with the
House report on the APA, which specifically required that informal
rulemakers "keep a record and analyze and consider all relevant matter
presented prior to the issuance of rules." 371 It is hard to imagine that
Congress did not intend that informal rulemakers would compile some
record of their decisionmaking process when it subjected such rules to
the possibility of judicial review. The reviewing court must have some-
thing other than the text of the rule if it is to assess even the legal valid-
ity of that rule, let alone its factual underpinnings.372
368. Id at 31-32.
369. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556(a) (1982); FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 102-10; A'r'Y GEN.
MAN., supra note 28, at 31.
370. See LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 225.
371. Id at 259. Cf. FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 229 ("Records of such [informal
rulemaking] hearings may be kept. ... ) (additional views and recommendations of Messrs.
McFarland, Stasen, and Vanderbilt).
372. As some have noted, the drafters of the APA expected that most judicial review of infor-
mal rulemaking would take place in a federal district court where "the facts pertinent to any
relevant question of law [would] be tried and determined de novo by the reviewing court respect-
ing either the validity or application of such rule or order--because facts necessary to the determi-
nation of any relevant question of law must be determined of record somewhere." LEG. HIsT.,
supra note 28, at 279-80, quotedin Auerbach, supra note 106, at 25; see LEG. HIST., supra note 28,
at 370. This congressional expectation of de novo judicial review of informal rules can be inter-
preted to reflect more of a concern for the adequacy of the agency's fact-finding process rather
than a confirmation of the contention that informal rulemakers are relieved of any record-keeping
requirement. See Auerbach, supra note 106, at 25.
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While it probably would be going too far to suggest that the absence
of a rulemaking record and a detailed explanation of the basis and pur-
pose of an informally promulgated rule would fatally compromise the
fairness of informal rulemaking, their presence will certainly enhance
the fairness of the process. By providing the public with complete and
accurate information about what the agency decided and why and how
it came to that decision, these procedures have an obvious and signifi-
cant impact on other post-promulgation procedural rights of the public.
The right to petition for agency reconsideration 37 3 or judicial review374
of final rules can be exercised most effectively only when the public is
fully and accurately apprised of the scope, basis, and purpose of the
rulemaker's decision. Recordmaking and explanation procedures also
provide mechanisms to police the procedural fairness of the rulemak-
ing process. A mandatory requirement that agencies fully explain and
document their decisions may well reveal that the agency has failed to
consider relevant public comment or has relied upon information or
materials which were not subjected to public notice and comment. In
addition, a published explanation and documentation of the agency's
decision enhances at least the appearance of fairness by opening up the
decisionmaking process to public scrutiny.
Similarly, the required preparation of a rulemaking record including
a full explanation by the rulemaker, while perhaps not vital to the ef-
fectiveness of the rulemaking process, will both improve and discipline
the evaluative stages of the agency's decisionmaking process. While
the requirement that rulemakers publicly document their deliberative
process cannot guarantee careful and thorough consideration of the is-
sues, it should provide a powerful incentive for such scrutiny.3 75 Be-
cause such procedures serve to police important procedural values in
rulemaking, in this instance the effectiveness of the process, perhaps
they should be considered vital to the achievement of that procedural
value.
Even if a rulemaking record and a full explanation are not consid-
ered essential for the fairness and effectiveness of rulemaking, it seems
clear that agency accountability is unacceptably compromised in the
absence of both. While Congress has a number of methods for holding
373. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1982).
374. Id § 702.
375. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975); see also W. GELLHORN, C. BvSE &
P. STRAUSS, supra note 74, at 363-64.
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agencies accountable for their actions, 76 and continues to explore new
techniques to enhance this accountability,377 it has placed its primary
reliance on judicial review of agency action.378 Without a complete
and organized rulemaking record and a detailed explanation of the ba-
sis and purpose of agency rules, courts cannot properly perform the
role they have been assigned in the administrative process.
The courts have been charged with insuring that agency rules repre-
sent rational implementations of congressionally prescribed regulatory
policies. While courts were once to presume the rationality of agency
decisionmaking,3 79 reviewing courts now have been instructed that re-
sponsible judicial supervision of all agency decisionmaking must be
"thorough, probing, and in depth."3 ' A presumption of regularity still
attaches to all agency action and the role of reviewing courts is limited
to a determination that the agency's decision is rational, but courts are
required nonetheless to subject the entire decisionmaking process of
even informal agency action to careful and searching inquiry. 31 When
courts review rules, the agency's factual perceptions, together with its
judgment about the legal significance of those perceptions, are to be
closely examined.382 While the court is not to substitute its own judg-
ment for that of the agency, neither is it to assume that the agency's
judgment is rational.38 3 Instead, agencies are to be held accountable by
the review of a court which must satisfy itself that the agency's rule is
the rational product of a rational decisionmaking process.38 4
While it is possible to describe the scope of this judicial review of
informal rulemaking and even its general limited nature without arous-
ing too much controversy, administrative theorists are currently at odds
376. See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, supra note 74, at 103-26.
377. See, e.g., S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2713-21 (daily ed. Mar. 24,
1982); see generally McGowan, Congress, Courts and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLuM. L.
REv. 1119 (1977).
378. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982). See LEG. HIsT., supra note 28, at 217, 281.
379. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935).
380. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
381. See id at 415-16.
382. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 11-37 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976).
383. See id; see also Wald, supra note 50, at 137-41.
384. See Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1145-48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1042 (1980); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. EPA, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024-28 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
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over both the measure of rationality demanded of rulemakers"' and
the methods to be employed by courts in testing for rational agency
decisionmaking.386 The interpretation of section 553 which is offered
here is not intended to contribute to either of these debates. Requiring
informal rulemakers to supply courts with the kind of detailed docu-
mentation and explanation outlined above does not substitute proce-
dural requirements for substantive judicial review or imply that courts
should scrutinize agency rules with any particular degree of intensity.
It merely seeks to provide courts with the tools necessary to engage in
the limited review which Congress has required.
If reviewing courts are to provide any reasonable barrier to arbitrary
decisionmaking, they cannot be expected to guess at or entirely recon-
struct the decisionmaking process.38 They must be provided with a
complete and organized rulemaking record and a detailed explanation
of the basis and purpose of an agency's rule. Courts simply do not
have the expertise, let alone the time and resources, to wander through
a huge and unwieldy rulemaking record guided only by vague and sim-
plistic indications of what the agency thought it had accomplished. 38
As Judge McGowan noted a few years ago:
[it is appropriate for us ... to caution against an overly literal reading of
the statutory terms "concise" and "general." These adjectives must be
accommodated to the realities of judicial scrutiny, which do not contem-
plate that the court itself will, by a laborious examination of the record,
formulate in the first instance the significant issues faced by the agency
and articulate the rationale of their resolution. We do not expect the
385. Compare Wright, supra note 29, at 391-94 (suggesting that rulemakers should be subject
to only the most rudimentary commands of rationality) and Verkuil, supra note 85, at 420-24
(suggesting that current substantive review of rules may be too intrusive) with Rodgers, supra note
53, at 701-09 (espousing a "hard look" substantive review which requires courts to make a
"searching and careful" review of agency rulemaking decisions) and Stewart, supra note 7, at 1811
(same) and Wald, supra note 50, at 150-54 (same).
386. Compare Bazelon, upra note 59, at 823 (suggesting that reviewing courts may do more to
insure reasoned decisionmaking by means of an intensive review of rulemaking procedures than
by engaging in a substantive review of the agency's ultimate decision) and McGowan, supra note
7, at 687 (same) and Wald supra note 50, at 140 (same) with Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (rejecting an intensive procedural review of rulemak-
ing in favor of a careful substantive scrutiny of the rulemaking decision), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976) and Byse, Scope ofJudicialReview in Informal Rulemaking, 33 AD. L. REv. 183, 188 (1981)
(same) and Wright, supra note 29, at 388-91 (same).
387. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 534-35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 79 (1982).
388. See id
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agency to discuss every item of fact or opinion included in the submis-
sions made to it in informal rulemaking. We do expect that, if the judicial
review which Congress has thought it important to provide is to be mean-
ingful, the "concise general statement of. .. basis and purpose" man-
dated by section 4 [section 553] will enable us to see what major issues of
policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency
reacted to them as it did.3 89
Other courts have made similar pleas for organized rulemaking records
that clearly demonstrate the process by which the agency reached its
factual and legal conclusions 390 and outline the agency's response to
significant challenges to those conclusions. 391 While courts must defer
to the reasonable exercise of agency expertise in most rulemaking mat-
ters, they can do so only when the agency provides some indication that
it has utilized that expertise.392
The Supreme Court also has recognized the need for administrative
assistance in responsible judicial review. In a number of cases, the
Court has demanded that agencies supply reviewing courts with
records that detail the agency's findings and conclusions and demon-
strate a process of reasoned decisionmaking.393 Even in Vermont Yan-
kee, the Court left undisturbed the judicially imposed requirement that
the agency prepare an organized rulemaking record and full explana-
tion of its entire decisionmaking process.394 Interestingly, it has never
seemed to bother the Court that neither the APA nor any organic stat-
ute explicitly required these agencies to assemble a record or to prepare
findings of fact or conclusions of law supporting their decisions. Con-
temporaneous documentation and a complete explanation of the
389. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (cita-
tion omitted).
390. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Texas v.
EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 308 n.31 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976); Florida Peach
Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1974); Buckeye Power,
Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 171 (6th Cir. 1973).
391. See, e.g., Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 677 F.2d 915, 927 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1979); PPG Indus. v. Costle,
630 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1980); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cen. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
392. See Wright, supra note 154, at 62.
393. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
394. See National Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 646, 652-53 (D.C. Cir.
1976), rey'd on other grounds sub nor. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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agency's decisionmaking process was deemed necessary if judicial re-
view of informal decisionmaking was to be at all effective.395 An inter-
pretation of the APA's notice and comment rulemaking provisions
which requires such procedures seems consistent with these decisions
and necessary to preserve the accountability of informal agency
rulemaking.
B. Judicial Review of the Procedural Discretion of Informal
Rulemakers
The preceding section outlined those procedures which, under a nor-
mative interpretation of the APA, must be employed by all informal
rulemakers subject to that act. In some informal rulemaking contexts,
however, these statutorily prescribed minimum procedures may not be
adequate, and an agency may find that certain additional procedures
are necessary to preserve the fairness, effectiveness, or accountability of
a rulemaking proceeding. Both the APA and its legislative history ex-
plicitly recognize that, in certain circumstances, informal rulemakers
may find it either necessary or expedient to utilize procedures beyond
those required by the statute. In section 553(c), for example,
rulemakers are given the authority to allow interested persons an "op-
portunity for oral presentation" during informal rulemaking in addi-
tion to the required written procedures.396 Both the House and Senate
reports on the APA encourage informal rulemakers to employ more
elaborate public procedures when the statute's minimum procedures
prove somehow inadequate. 397 Administrative practice demonstrates
that agencies frequently take advantage of this procedural authority
and, rather than limit public participation to the submission of written
comments, expand their procedural formats to include legislative-type
public hearings or even limited trial-type hearings, complete with op-
portunities for direct and cross-examination. 398
This section deals with the question of whether and to what extent
the agency's decision to employ (or not employ) such additional
rulemaking procedures may be challenged on judicial review. In Ver-
mont Yankee, the Supreme Court seemed to indicate that while such
agency decisions might be subjected to judicial scrutiny, the scope of
395. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1975).
396. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
397. See LEG. HIST., supra note 28, at 200-01, 259.
398. See authorities cited supra note 11.
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any such review was to be quite narrow. 99 Once informal rulemakers
have complied with the APA's required procedures they "should be
free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of
inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous
duties."' 4  Apparently, reviewing courts may find procedural abuse
only in extraordinary situations where "constitutional constraints or ex-
tremely compelling circumstances" may justify judicial intrusion.4° '
As the Supreme Court has pointed out, there are sound reasons for
restricting judicial review of the procedural discretion of informal
rulemakers. A judiciary free to substitute its own notions of procedural
propriety for those of the agency might cripple the rulemaking pro-
cess." 2 Rulemaking proceedings would be routinely subjected to pro-
cedural attacks at the hands of those adversely affected by the
substance of the rule, often simply to delay the effect of that rule. To
protect their rules from possible invalidation on procedural grounds,
informal rulemakers would be forced to employ every conceivable pro-
cedural device lest the failure to include some protection be deemed an
abuse of the agency's procedural discretion by a reviewing court.40 3
However, Vermont Yankee's discussion of the need for limited re-
view of an informal rulemaker's procedural discretion left a number of
questions unresolved. For instance, what circumstances are to be con-
sidered so "extremely compelling" that a judicial remand for addi-
tional procedures or invalidation of the agency's rule will be
justified?4" And in those circumstances, how should a court evaluate
the procedural judgments of informal rulemakers? What criteria
should guide a court in measuring those judgments? At least two com-
mentators have sought to provide answers to these questions and, in the
process, have proposed a model for judicial review of alleged abuse of
procedural discretion which provides an excellent framework for anal-
ysis.4°5 The following discussion adopts that model but emphasizes the
399. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978).
400. Id at 543-44 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)).
401. Id
402. See id at 547.
403. See id
404. See id at 543.
405. See Barr, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking Procedure: When May Something More
Formal Be Required, 27 AM. U.L. Rav. 781, 812-17 (1978); Williams, supra note 43, at 445-46. See
generallyr Hahn, supra note 20.
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criteria to be used by courts in analyzing claims of alleged procedural
abuse. Not surprisingly, these substantive criteria are the same criteria
which should inform a judicial interpretation of the APA's minimum
procedural requirements.' Thus, it is suggested that an agency abuses
its procedural discretion when it fails to employ procedural devices
necessary to ensure the fairness, effectiveness, efficiency, or accounta-
bility of a particular rulemaking procedure.
While some may have doubted even the ability of the courts to re-
view the procedural discretion of informal rulemakers,4 °7 the legislative
history of the APA and past Supreme Court precedent confirm the le-
gitimacy of such review." 8 Any remaining doubt was surely put to rest
by the Court in Vermont Yankee. While the scope of such review is to
be narrow, its existence is nonetheless confirmed by the Court's
opinion.4°9
406. See supra text accompanying notes 17-6 1.
407. See Byse, supra note 88, at 1826.
It may be answered that although the decision concerning utilization of additional proce-
dures in section 553 rulemaking proceedings is initially or primarily a matter for the
agency, the court may review the agency's decision. But on review, the court must first
determine whether and to what extent the decision is committed to the agency's discre-
tion. It is a generally accepted principle of administrative law that agencies should be
free to fashion their own rules of procedure.
Id (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)). Professor Byse's curi-
ous use of the phrase "committed to the agency's discretion" recalls the statutory language of the
APA precluding all judicial review of agency action "to the extent that . . . agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). Thus, it is not clear whether
Byse would shield the discretionary procedural choices of rulemakers from all judicial review.
Given the extremely narrow scope of the statutory preclusion of judicial review, see Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), it seems doubtful that all judicial
review of an agency's procedural choices is prohibited. Indeed, Byse implies in a later article that
limited judicial review of an agency's procedural decision would be permissible. He quotes with
approval Professor Jaffe's observation that "the exercise of discretion is relevant to the making of
procedural decisions. . . in the absence of a clear legal prescription, a reasonable decision should
withstand judicial interference; and. . . reasonableness should be considered in terms of the re-
sponsibility of the agency for a total program, allowing for the fact that the agency's resources are
limited." Byse, supra note 386, at 188 (quoting L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 567 (1965)). See also Barr, supra note 405, at 812 n.168.
408. See, e.g., LEG. HIsT., supra note 28, at 199, 217, 258, 278 (although agency may, in its
discretion, dispense with all notice and public procedures for "good cause," courts are to review
such determinations). See also FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 333-34
(1976) (a reviewing court may dictate additional procedures to an agency where substantial justifi-
cation exists); SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (setting forth a balancing test for
courts to utilize in deciding whether an agency's choice of individual ad hoc litigation to develop
policy constitutes an abuse of discretion). See generally Jaffe, Judicial Review of Procedural Deci-
sions and the Philco Case: Plus (Ia ChangeZ 50 GEo. L.J. 661 (1962).
409. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
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In line with the Court's demand for limited review, it is appropriate
to place a substantial burden on those seeking to have an informal rule
set aside on the grounds that the agency failed to provide some proce-
dural protection not minimally required by the APA or the agency's
organic statute.41 ° To trigger such review, petitioners should be re-
quired to show that a request for additional procedures was timely
made, that the request outlined with specificity what procedures were
sought and why those procedures should have been employed by the
rulemaker, and finally, that the agency's denial of petitioner's request
was either unexplained or unreasonable.4 '
Certainly petitioners should not be heard to complain of alleged pro-
cedural harm which might well have been avoided had a timely request
for additional procedures been made during the rulemaking proceed-
ing. Reviewing courts have long attempted to preserve the integrity of
the administrative process by affording agencies at least some opportu-
nity to correct their own errors or omissions before resort to judicial
review.41 That principle should also hold true in the context of proce-
dural challenges to informal rulemaking. If decisions on the need for
extra-statutory procedures are to remain with the agency, at least in the
first instance, the agency must be given an opportunity to make those
decisions. Absent a timely request for additional procedural protection
directed to the agency by affected parties, the agency is deprived of that
opportunity and should not find its rulemaking efforts jeopardized as a
result.
A reviewing court should refuse to entertain broad or very genera-
lized requests for additional procedures which fail both to demonstrate
the inadequacy of the APA's mandated procedures and to explain how
petitioner's requested procedures would serve to alleviate those inade-
quacies. Thus, the bare contention that a rulemaker should have sup-
plemented the APA's paper procedures with an "oral hearing" in order
U.S. 519, 542-45 (1978) (judicial review of agency's procedural choices permitted in extremely
compelling circumstances or to vindicate constitutional procedural rights). See also Barr, supra
note 405, at 800.
410. See Barr, supra note 405, at 815; Williams, supra note 43, at 445-46.
411. See Barr, supra note 405, at 813-17; Williams, supra note 43, at 445-46.
412. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); seealso Barrsupra note 405, at 815; Williams, supra note 43,
at 424.
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to "ventilate" the issues should evoke little judicial sympathy.413 An
"oral hearing," even when specifically defined as a trial-type hearing
with the opportunity for direct and cross-examination, is no talisman of
procedural propriety in rulemaking.4 t4 A particular procedural device
has no value in and of itself. Rather, it takes on value only when
viewed in an instrumental fashion as a means toward the accomplish-
ment of fair, efficient, effective, or accountable rulemaking. Without a
demonstration by the petitioner that these practical and political goals
are jeopardized in the absence of further rulemaking procedures, the
agency's decision to utilize only those procedures which are generally
protective of those goals is entitled to judicial deference and respect.
Indeed, without such a demonstration it is unclear how any reviewing
court would be able to evaluate whether the failure to employ further
procedures constituted an abuse of the agency's procedural discretion.
When, however, a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of the
need for further rulemaking procedures, the burden should then fall
upon the agency either to adopt the requested procedures or to explain
its refusal to do so. 415 Should the rulemaking record fail to reveal a
clear and complete explanation by the agency for its denial of the addi-
tional procedures, the court may and should remand the matter to the
agency for further clarification. 16 Subsequent review would then be
based upon the explanation generated by that remand.
When reviewing the merits of the issue, reviewing courts should find
that a rulemaker has abused her discretion only when it is clear that the
agency has failed to utilize a rulemaking procedure which, in the con-
text of the particular proceeding, is necessary for the assurance of fair-
ness, effectiveness, efficiency, or accountability. If the agency's
rulemaking record demonstrates a reasoned examination of the need
for the requested procedures and a rational decision to meet those
needs by means of other procedures, the courts should sustain that de-
413. See, eg., American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F. 2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 843 (1966); see also Barr, supra note 405, at 815; Williams, supra note 43, at 445-46.
414. See Barr, supra note 405, at 818 n.178. See also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC,
498 F.2d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1974); American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
415. See Barr, supra note 405, at 816.
416. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 94-95 (1943).
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cision.4t 7 Thus, even though a reviewing court may feel that the addi-
tional procedures would be a better or even the best method of assuring
normative propriety in a particular informal rulemaking proceeding, it
should not substitute its procedural judgments for those of the
agency.418 Only when the additional procedure is, in the particular
context, absolutely essential for the preservation of the normative val-
ues of informal rulemaking should a court find that the agency's failure
to employ that procedure is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of its
discretion.
This narrow approach to judicial review of the procedural discretion
of informal rulemakers need not rest on debatable conclusions about
the relative procedural expertise of courts or agencies.419 It is not a
question of institutional competence but rather of institutional integrity
which compels restrictive procedural review by courts. A limited pro-
cedural scrutiny is necessary to prevent undue judicial intrusion into an
area clearly reserved by Congress to the discretion of its rulemaking
agents.420 The courts' responsibilities in the rulemaking process, at
least with respect to its procedural aspects, extend only to the preserva-
tion of those normative values which Congress has decided should
characterize all informal rulemaking. In these "extremely compelling
circumstances," where the very existence of those values is threatened
by a rulemaker's procedural choice, judicial correction is not only ap-
propriate, but necessary. Where, however, the courts seek not to pre-
serve those values but rather to expand their scope in a particular
rulemaking context, they overstep the bounds of their responsibilities.
This is not to say that even limited judicial review cannot be an effec-
tive tool to police and correct the procedural choices of informal
rulemakers. The enormous regulatory landscape upon which informal
rulemakers must operate makes it highly unlikely that the APA's man-
dated procedures, even when normatively interpreted, will always suf-
fice to preserve fairness, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability.
417. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 567 (1965); Byse, supra
note 386, at 187-90.
418. See Byse, supra note 386, at 188-90.
419. Compare Byse, supra note 386, at 186-87 (administrators rather than judges are the ex-
perts m administrative rulemaking procedure) with McGowan, supra note 7, at 685-86 (justifying
an intensive judicial review of rulemaking procedures on the basis of a general judicial expertise
in matters of decisionmaking procedure).
420. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978). See also LEG. HIsT., supra note 28, at 19, 200-01, 259.
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There will almost certainly be instances when a rulemaker cannot rea-
sonably refuse to afford additional procedural opportunity or protec-
tion to those affected by the rulemaking.42 1 It may be necessary, for
example, for the agency to alter its decisionmaking process when its
proposed arrangement combines the agency's decisionmaking and ad-
vocacy functions to such a degree that the normative values of informal
rulemaking are seriously threatened.422 The APA does not require the
separation of these different agency functions in the context of
rulemaking proceedings even when rulemaking is conducted in a for-
mal trial-like fashion.4 2 3 In the past, attempts to impose such require-
ments on rulemakers have failed.424 But an agency may abuse its
procedural discretion when decision-making responsibilities are as-
signed to employees previously involved in the advocacy of a proposed
rule or employees subject to the supervision or direction of those
advocates.425
Similarly, post-comment period consultations between an agency's
staff advocates and its decisionmakers on questions of fact or policy
should be given careful scrutiny by courts.42 6 This combination of
functions presents a serious threat to the fairness of informal rulemak-
ing in much the same way as would a biased rulemaker. When the
final decisionmaking process is exposed to the unopposed and hidden
advocacy of the proposal's in-house proponents, the rulemaker may be
left with a skewed approach to the issues which undermines the effec-
tiveness of the rulemaking process. The particular circumstances of
each case will undoubtedly play a large role in determining whether an
instance of combined agency functions in rulemaking has compro-
mised the normative values which must characterize that process, but
421. See Illinois v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1981); International Har-
vester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See generally Williams,supra
note 43, at 445-46.
422. See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1215-16 & n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). See also Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 124, 127-28 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 75-76 (D.C. Cir. 1978). These cases
seem to leave open the possibility that, in certain circumstances, the courts might well find fault
with an unfair combination of advocacy and decisionmaking in rulemaking.
423. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982). See United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1212-13 &
n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing ATT'y GEN. MAN., supra note 28, at 15), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913
(1981).
424. See cases cited supra note 422.
425. See id
426. See id
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where those values are so threatened, an agency abuses its procedural
discretion.
In some circumstances an informal rulemaker's failure to allow for
oral presentation or cross-examination might be unreasonable.427
While the particular rulemaking context will be significant, there may
be instances when needed information cannot be readily obtained
through the use of written procedures either because the material is not
susceptible to written presentation or because of the inability of af-
fected persons to express their concerns in writing. In both instances,
the fairness and effectiveness of the agency's rulemaking efforts may
depend upon the use of oral hearings to such an extent that a failure to
utilize those procedures becomes unreasonable. As others have ably
demonstrated, oral hearings with direct and cross-examination are
sometimes necessary to fairly and effectively resolve certain types of
factual issues.428 The mere fact that such issues surface in the context
of informal rulemaking should not serve to excuse the employment of
those procedures when they are needed to preserve the normative val-
ues of informal rulemaking.
It is neither possible, nor really necessary, to examine every type of
challenge which might be raised to the procedural discretion of
rulemakers, or for that matter, even to predict with any confidence the
outcome of disputes over the need for oral procedures or separation of
functions in informal rulemaking. Such conclusions on the scope of an
informal rulemaker's procedural discretion will always present review-
ing courts with difficult decisions. In any event, such conclusions
should only be made after a contextual analysis. What is more impor-
tant is the development of a consistent approach toward judicial review
of the procedural discretion of informal rulemakers. In this respect, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee can be a two-edged
sword. To the extent that the opinion forbids routine and heavy-
handed judicial intrusion into the procedural discretion of rulemakers,
it preserves the integrity of both the administrative and judicial
processes. On the other hand, the opinion should not stand as a barrier
to the recognition that courts can and should review the procedural
choices of rulemakers, subjecting those choices to a careful and search-
ing examination for a rationality that safeguards the normative values
427. See authorities cited supra note 421.
428. See Illinois v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1981); Williams, supra note
43, at 445-46.
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of informal rulemaking. What is suggested here is an approach to judi-
cial review of procedural discretion which combines both judicial re-
straint and a judicial sensitivity to these normative values. Properly
utilized it may not only protect the integrity of the rulemaking process
but preserve its legitimacy as well.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to present a theory for judicial review of
the adequacy of informal rulemaking procedures in the modem regula-
tory context. The theory seeks to preserve the procedural values which
underlie the rulemaking provisions of the federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. The need for such a theory seems clear. Congress has re-
peatedly failed to confront the fact that the modem regulatory arena
bears little resemblance to that which confronted the drafters of the
APA forty years ago. While the procedural values which should gov-
ern the rulemaking process surely retain their validity, the procedural
framework for rulemaking found in the APA no longer serves to effec-
tuate those values. This "crisis" has been exacerbated by the Supreme
Court's conception of the APA and the Court's restrictive approach to
judicial review of informal rulemaking procedures. Absent congres-
sional amendment of the APA's notice and comment rulemaking pro-
visions or the adoption of a new formula for procedural review, the
efficacy and acceptability of informal rulemaking as a regulatory tool
can and should be questioned. The theory of judicial review presented
here accords due deference to the procedural discretion of agency
rulemakers while seeking to protect procedural values which will pre-
serve the integrity of informal rulemaking. The theory recognizes the
power of courts to review the procedural decisions of rulemakers and to
require the use of procedures essential to fair, effective, efficient, and
accountable rulemaking. It presents a comprehensive re-interpretation
of the APA's required rulemaking procedures in light of these proce-
dural values and suggests an approach to judicial review of a
rulemaker's discretionary procedural choices premised on these same
values. Properly implemented, this theory of judicial review should as-
sist in preserving the legitimacy of informal rulemaking.
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